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Abstract
We develop a tractable two-country overlapping-generations model and show
that cross-country differences in financial development can explain three recent em-
pirical patterns of international capital flows: Financial capital flows from relatively
poor to relatively rich countries, while foreign direct investment flows in the oppo-
site direction; net capital flows go from poor to rich countries; despite its negative
net international investment positions, the United States receives a positive net
investment income.
International capital mobility affects output in each country directly through the
size of domestic investment and indirectly through the aggregate saving rate. Under
certain conditions, the indirect effect may dominate the direct effect so that inter-
national capital mobility raises output in the poor country and globally, although
net capital flows are in the direction to the rich country. We also explore the welfare
and distributional effects of international capital flows and show that the patterns
of capital flows may reverse along the convergence process of a developing country.
Our model adds to the understanding of the costs and the benefits of international
capital mobility in the presence of domestic financial frictions.
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1 Introduction
Standard international macroeconomics predicts that capital flows from capital-rich coun-
tries, where the marginal product of capital (MPK, henceforth) is low, to capital-poor
countries, where the MPK is high. Furthermore, there should be no difference between
gross and net capital flows, as capital movements are unidirectional.
The patterns of international capital flows observed in the past 20 years, however,
stand in stark contrast to these predictions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2007b,c).
First, since 1998, the average per-capita income of countries running current account
surpluses has been below that of the deficit countries, i.e., net capital flows have been
“uphill” from poor to rich countries (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2006, 2007).
Second, many developing economies, including China, Malaysia, and South Africa, are
net importers of foreign direct investment (hereafter, FDI) and net exporters of financial
capital at the same time, while developed countries such as France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States exhibit the opposite pattern (Ju and Wei, 2010). Third, despite
its negative net international investment position since 1986, the U.S. has been receiving
a positive net investment income until 2005 (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007; Hausmann and
Sturzenegger, 2007; Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille, 2007).
Recent research offers two main explanations for these empirical facts. Devereux
and Sutherland (2009) and Tille and van Wincoop (2010) focus on the cross-country
risk-sharing investors can achieve by diversifying their portfolios globally. International
portfolio investment is determined by the cross-correlation patterns of aggregate shocks
at the country level. These models do not distinguish between FDI and portfolio equity
investment and, therefore, offer no explanation for the second pattern.
The other strand of literature focuses on domestic financial market imperfections
(Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki, 2009; Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008). Mat-
suyama (2004) shows that, in the presence of credit market imperfections, financial mar-
ket globalization may lead to a steady-state equilibrium in which fundamentally identical
countries end up with different levels of per capita output, a result he calls “symmetry
breaking”. Furthermore, financial capital flows from poor to rich countries in the steady
state. However, Matsuyama (2004) does not address FDI flows. Mendoza, Quadrini, and
Rios-Rull (2009) analyze the joint determination of financial capital flows and FDI in
a heterogeneous-agent model with uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment and investment
risks. The precautionary savings motive plays the crucial role. Ju and Wei (2010) show
in a static model that, when both FDI and financial capital flows are allowed, all finan-
cial capital leaves the country where credit market imperfections are more severe, while
FDI flows into this country. Thus, capital mobility allows investors to fully bypass the
underdeveloped financial system. The models mentioned above explain only one or two
of the three facts.
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While the literature does not explicitly address the implications of international capital
mobility for aggregate output, it seems intuitively plausible that, due to the declining
MPK, “uphill” capital flows make the poor countries and the world poorer.1 The policy
implications seem to be clear: The world would be better off without international capital
movements between rich and poor countries.
We extend the second strand of literature and explain all three empirical facts. Follow-
ing Matsuyama (2004), we take the tightness of the borrowing constraints as a measure
of a country’s level of financial development. The two countries in our model differ fun-
damentally only in the level of financial development.
Under international financial autarky (hereafter, IFA), interest rates are affected by
two factors. First, for a given level of financial development, a lower capital-labor ratio
implies a higher MPK and higher interest rates. We call this the neoclassical effect, as
it arises from the concavity of the neoclassical production function with respect to the
capital-labor ratio. Second, for a given capital-labor ratio, a lower level of financial devel-
opment means less efficient enforcement of credit contracts and monitoring of borrowers.
In this case, agents face tighter borrowing constraints and the lower aggregate credit
demand leads to a lower loan rate and a higher equity rate. We call this the financial-
underdevelopment effect. In the less financially developed country, the steady-state loan
rate is lower and the steady-state equity rate is higher. In the case of interest-elastic sav-
ing, domestic financial frictions also distort aggregate saving through the interest rates,
leading to lower investment and output.
Suppose that the two countries are initially in the steady state under IFA. Upon allow-
ing full capital mobility, the initial cross-country interest rate differentials drive financial
capital flows from the poor to the rich country and FDI flows in the opposite direction.
Due to its larger credit capacity, the more financially developed country receives net cap-
ital inflows. Thus, net capital flows are “uphill” from the poor to the rich country. Since
the rich country receives a higher return on its FDI assets than it pays on its foreign debts,
it gets a positive net investment income despite its negative net international investment
position. Intuitively, by “exporting” its superior financial services through two-way cap-
ital flows, the rich country receives a positive net reward, accordingly. Thus, our model
predictions are consistent with the three empirical facts mentioned above.
Building upon this model, we make three contributions to the literature. First, we
show that full capital mobility can raise output in the poor country as well as globally,
despite “uphill” net capital flows. Intuitively, financial frictions depress the return on and,
hence, the level of aggregate saving. Allowing for international capital mobility provides
domestic households with better returns on savings. Thus, by ameliorating the interest
rate distortions, capital mobility indirectly raises aggregate savings in the less financially
developed country. If saving is sufficiently interest-elastic, the rise in aggregate saving
1Matsuyama (2004) and von Hagen and Zhang (2010) show that this may indeed be the case.
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may exceeds net capital outflows so that aggregate investment and output in the less
financially developed country as well as globally can be higher than under IFA.
The interest elasticity of saving has been the focus of the debates on the effectiveness
of tax reform (Bernheim, 2002; Evans, 1983; Summers, 1981), financial liberalization
(Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan, and Schiantarelli, 2000), and other public policies (Corbo
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991) on capital accumulation. Our model complements the existing
literature by emphasizing the relevance of interest-elastic saving to the output implications
of capital account liberalization policies.2 The empirical evidence on the magnitude of the
interest elasticity of savings is rather mixed (Giovannini, 1983; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel,
and Serven, 2000). In particular, Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart (1996) provide evidence
that savings are more responsive to rates of return at higher income levels.
As our second contribution, we show that financial capital flows affect the owners of
credit capital and equity capital in opposite ways and so do FDI flows. Capital flows
also affect the intergenerational income distribution. Such distributional effects offer an
explanation for why capital account liberalization often encounters both support and
opposition in a given country.
Third, we analyze a scenario where one country is more financially developed and in its
steady state, while the other country is less financially developed and below its steady state
before capital account liberalization. We study the interactions of international capital
flows and the economic convergence in the second country. The results show that the
pattern of international capital flows may reverse along the convergence path, depending
on the relative strength of the neoclassical effect and the financial underdevelopment
effect. We then use the data from ten Central and Eastern European countries and five
ASEAN countries to offer some suggestive evidence supporting these predictions.
Our model differs from the existing literature in the following aspects. The static
model of Ju and Wei (2010) is useful for analyzing the immediate impacts of capital
account liberalization, while our OLG model facilitates a short-run and long-run analysis.
Devereux and Sutherland (2009), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), and Tille
and van Wincoop (2010) capture international capital flows in settings with aggregate
or idiosyncratic uncertainty, while our model features international capital flows in a
deterministic setting. Buera and Shin (2010), Sandri (2010), Angeletos and Panousi
(2011), Carroll and Jeanne (2011), and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) address
“uphill” financial capital flows, while we focus on the joint determination of financial
capital and FDI flows. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) and Mendoza, Quadrini,
and Rios-Rull (2009) analyze the joint determination of financial capital and FDI flows
2Interest-elastic saving is key to the output gains in our model. It results from the assumption that
individuals work and consume in both periods of life. The higher the future labor income, the more
interest-elastic the saving is, which is known as the human wealth effect (Summers, 1981). Our model
predicts that saving is more interest elastic in fast-growing countries so that capital mobility is more
likely to be beneficial for such economies.
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in an endowment-economy model, while endogenous capital accumulation is crucial in
our model. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) assume that foreign direct investors
from the more financially developed country have an advantage in capitalizing the return
on investment in the host country and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) assume
that investors from the more financially developed country can insure their foreign direct
investment using the better risk-sharing opportunities in their home country. We do not
need these extra assumptions. Sandri (2010) and Carroll and Jeanne (2011) feature the
precautionary savings channel in a model with idiosyncratic risk and incomplete markets,
while we feature interest-elastic savings in a model with limited commitment.
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) present a direct estimation of cross-country MPK differences
to assess the importance of international credit market frictions. They abstract from do-
mestic financial frictions so that the MPK is the rate of return to investors and the driving
force behind international capital flows. They find that, if one focuses on reproducible
capital and adjusts for the higher relative prices of capital goods in poor countries, the
MPK does not differ much between developed and developing countries. Thus, they con-
clude that international credit market frictions cannot go far in explaining observed capital
flows between these countries. We take this as a starting point and assume that there is
no barriers to international capital flows in the scenario of full capital mobility. Instead,
we focus on the implications of domestic financial frictions for international capital flows.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and shows
the distortions of financial frictions on interest rates and output under IFA. Section 3
analyzes the output and welfare implications of full capital mobility. Section 4 concludes.
The technical proofs and relevant discussions are available in the on-line appendix.
2 The Model under International Financial Autarky
The world economy consists of two countries, N (North) and S (South), which are funda-
mentally identical except in the level of financial development as specified later. In the
following, variables in country i ∈ {N,S} are denoted with the superscript i. A final good
can be consumed or transformed into capital. The final good is internationally tradable
and chosen as the numeraire, while capital goods are non-tradable.
Individuals live for two periods, young and old. There is no population growth and the
size of each generation is normalized to one in each country. Each individual is endowed
with one unit of labor when young and  ≥ 0 units of labor when old, which are supplied
to aggregate production. Aggregate labor supply is L = 1 +  in each period.
At the beginning of each period, final goods Y it are produced with capital K
i
t and
labor L in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. Capital fully depreciates after production. Capital
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and labor are rewarded at their respective marginal products. To summarize,
Y it =
(
Kit
α
)α(
L
1− α
)1−α
, where α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
RitK
i
t = αY
i
t and ω
i
tL = (1− α)Y it , (2)
where ωit denotes the wage rate and R
i
t denotes the MPK. There is no uncertainty in the
economy. In this section, we assume that international capital flows are not allowed.
Each generation consists of two types of individuals, entrepreneurs and households, of
mass η and 1− η, respectively. They have Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption,
ui,jt =
(
ci,jy,t
1− β
)1−β (
ci,jo,t+1
β
)β
, (3)
where superscript j ∈ {e, h} denotes entrepreneurs or households; ci,jy,t and ci,jo,t+1 denote
individual j’s consumption when young and when old; β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of
patience, i.e., a larger β means that individuals are more patient and care more about
consumption when old. If β = 1, they only consume when old, ui,jt = c
i,j
o,t+1.
An individual j born in period t and country i receives a labor income ωit, consumes
ci,jy,t, and saves s
i,j
t = ω
i
t−ci,hy,t at a gross interest rate of Ri,jt in period t. In period t+1, after
receiving the financial income Ri,jt s
i,j
t and a labor income ω
i
t+1, the individual consumes
its total wealth ci,jo,t+1 = R
i,j
t s
i,j
t + ω
i
t+1 and exits from the economy. Its lifetime budget
constraint is ci,jy,t +
ci,jo,t+1
Ri,jt
= Wi,jt , where W
i,j
t ≡ ωit + ω
i
t+1
Ri,jt
denotes its discounted lifetime
wealth when young and
ωit+1
Ri,jt
captures human wealth as defined by Summers (1981). Given
Cobb-Douglas preferences, its optimal consumption-saving choices are
ci,jy,t = (1− β)Wi,jt and ci,jo,t+1 = Ri,jt βWi,jt , (4)
si,jt = ω
i
t − ci,jy,t = βωit − (1− β)
ωit+1
Ri,jt
. (5)
Substitute (4) into (3) to get the indirect lifetime utility function, ui,jt =W
i,j
t (R
i,j
t )
β.
We assume that only entrepreneurs can use final goods to produce capital goods. If
an entrepreneur invests one unit of final goods in period t, it yields one unit of capital
goods in period t + 1. The gross rate of return to the investment made in period t is
equal to the MPK in period t+ 1, Rit+1. With no other investment opportunity available,
households lend their entire savings to the credit market at the gross interest rate Ri,ht . As
long as Rit+1 ≥ Ri,ht , the entrepreneur prefers to finance his investment iit using loans di,ht .
However, due to limited commitment, the entrepreneur can borrow only up to a fraction
of his future project revenues,
Ri,ht d
i,h
t = R
i,h
t (i
i
t − di,et ) ≤ θiRit+1iit. (6)
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where di,et denotes the entrepreneur’s own funds, i.e., equity capital, in the project. Fol-
lowing Matsuyama (2004, 2007), we use θi ∈ [0, 1] as a measure of financial development
or the severity of credit market imperfections in country i. It captures a wide range of
institutional factors and is higher in countries with more sophisticated financial and legal
systems, better creditor protection, more liquid asset market, etc.
Define the equity rate as the rate of return to entrepreneurial equity capital,
Ri,et ≡
Rit+1i
i
t −Ri,ht di,ht
di,et
= Rit+1 + (R
i
t+1 −Ri,ht )(λit − 1) ≥ Ri,ht , (7)
where λit ≡ i
i
t
di,et
denotes the investment-equity ratio. For a unit of equity capital invested,
the entrepreneur can borrow (λit − 1) units of final goods in period t; in period t + 1, he
receives the net return from the leveraged investment, (Rit+1−Ri,ht )(λit−1), in addition to
the marginal product of its equity capital, Rit+1. Iff R
i
t+1 > R
i,h
t , he borrows to the limit
defined by (6) to fully exploit the leverage effect; after repaying the debt in period t+1, he
gets (1−θi)Rit+1iit and the equity rate is Ri,et = (1−θ
i)Rit+1i
i
t
di,et
=
(1−θi)Rit+1iit
iit−di,ht
=
(1−θi)Rit+1
1− θ
iRit+1
R
i,h
t
> Ri,ht .
If Ri,ht = R
i
t+1, he does not borrow to the limit; after repaying the debt in period t + 1,
he gets Rit+1d
i,e
t and the equity rate is R
i,e
t = R
i
t+1. The non-negative leverage effect
ensures that the equity rate is no less than the loan rate and inequality (7) thus marks
the entrepreneur’s participation constraint.
In the following, the social rate of return refers to the MPK, while the private rates
of return refer to the loan rate and the equity rate.
The markets for credit capital, equity capital, capital goods, and final goods clear,
Si,ht = (1− η)si,ht = Di,ht = ηdi,ht , and Si,et = ηsi,et = Di,et = ηdi,et , (8)
Kit+1 = ηi
i
t = D
i,h
t +D
i,e
t , and C
i
t +K
i
t+1 = Y
i
t (9)
where Si,ht and D
i,h
t denote the aggregate credit supply and demand, S
i,e
t and D
i,e
t denote
the aggregate equity supply and demand, and Cit ≡ η(ci,ey,t + ci,eo,t) + (1 − η)(ci,hy,t + ci,ho,t)
denotes aggregate consumption in country i and period t.
Definition 1. Given the level of financial development θi, a market equilibrium in country
i ∈ {N,S} under IFA is a set of allocations of households, {ci,hy,t, si,ht , ci,ho,t}, entrepreneurs,
{iit, ci,ey,t, si,et , ci,eo,t}, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , ωit, Rit, Ri,ht , Ri,et }, satisfying equations
(1)-(2), (4)-(9),
2.1 The Model Solution
Some auxiliary parameters are needed to simplify notation, ρ ≡ α
1−α ,m ≡ (1−β)(1+)ρ , θ¯ ≡ 1−η,
R ≡ (1+)ρ
β
(1 +m), Ai ≡ 1− θ¯−θi
1−η , B
i ≡ 1 + θ¯−θi
η
, which are interpreted as follows.
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With the Cobb-Douglas preferences, the income effect and the substitution effect of
interest rates cancel out so that an individual consumes the fraction (1−β) of its lifetime
wealth when young.  > 0 makes its lifetime wealth interest-elastic through human
wealth. Thus, according to equations (4) and (5), consumption and saving when young
are interest elastic iff β < 1 and  > 0 and, hence, m > 0. As shown below in Lemma 1,
m captures the joint impacts of these two factors on the interest elasticity of saving.
θ¯ is a critical value. As shown below, for θi ≥ θ¯, the borrowing constraint is slack so
that the social and the private rates of return are equal to R in the steady state. For
θi ∈ [0, θ¯), the borrowing constraint is binding, Ai and Bi measure the wedge between
the private and the social rates of return with 0 < Ai < 1 < Bi and ∂A
i
∂θi
> 0 > ∂B
i
∂θi
.
The aggregate rewards to capital in period t+ 1 are distributed to individuals as the
returns to their savings, (1− η)si,ht Ri,ht + ηsi,et Ri,et = Rit+1Kit+1, where Rit+1Kit+1 = ρLωit+1
according to equation (2). Using equation (5) to substitute away si,jt , we get
(1− η)Ri,ht + ηRi,et =
ωit+1
ωit
R, (10)
which is called the reward splitting rule.
In the following, we first show the model solution in the case of the binding borrowing
constraints and then discuss the condition under which this assumption is true.3 Let
XIFA denote the steady-state value of variable Xt under IFA. The model solution is,
Kit+1 =
βωit
m+ 1
[
1− m(1−A
i)(Bi − 1)
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
]
, (11)
Ri,et =
ωit+1
ωit
R
(
1 +
Bi − 1
m+ 1
)
, (12)
Ri,ht =
ωit+1
ωit
R
(
1− 1−A
i
m+ 1
)
, (13)
Rit+1 =
ωit+1
ωit
R
[
1 +
m(1−Ai)(Bi − 1)
(m+ 1)(m+AiBi)
]
, (14)
ψit ≡
Ri,ht
Rit+1
= ψiIFA = 1−
(1−Ai)Bi
m+Bi
, (15)
ωit+1 =
(
Λit
R
ωit
)α
, where Λit = Λ
i
IFA =
(m+AiBi)(m+ 1)
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
, (16)
∂ ln ΛiIFA
∂θi
=
m(Bi − 1)
(m+AiBi)(m+Ai)
∂Ai
∂θi
− m(1−A
i)
(m+AiBi)(m+Bi)
∂Bi
∂θi
≥ 0. (17)
ψit is the relative loan rate and Λ
i
t is the aggregate efficiency indicator. Both are time-
invariant under IFA. The model dynamics are characterized by equation (16). For α ∈
(0, 1), a unique and stable steady state exists with the wage at ωiIFA =
(
ΛiIFA
R
)ρ
.
θ¯ is the critical value for the borrowing constraints to be binding. If θi = θ¯, Ai = Bi =
1 and thus, Ri,ht = R
i
t+1 =
ωit+1
ωit
R, so that the borrowing constraints are weakly binding.
3See the proof of Proposition 1 in appendix A for the model solution.
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In this case, the aggregate credit demand is strong enough to push the loan rate equal
to the social rate of return, ψi = 1; according to equation (7), the zero spread implies
that Ri,et = R
i
t+1 = R
i,h
t =
ωit+1
ωit
R = R1−αρα(1−α)(K
i
t
L
)−α(1−α). Intuitively, in the country
with a lower capital-labor ratio
Kit
L
, the growth rate
ωit+1
ωit
is higher and so are the interest
rates. We call this the neoclassical effect, as it arises from the concavity of the neoclassical
production function with respect to the capital-labor ratio. For θi > θ¯, entrepreneurs do
not have an incentive to borrow to the limit and the equilibrium allocation is identical as
in the case of θi = θ¯. In both cases, aggregate saving
βωit
1+m
is transformed by entrepreneurs
into capital so that the aggregate efficiency indicator is ΛiIFA = 1. In the steady state,
the wage is ωiIFA = R
−ρ, and the interest rates are Ri,jIFA = R
i
IFA = R. Iff θ
i < θ¯, it holds
that Ai < 1 < Bi. According to equations (13) and (14), Ri,ht <
ωit+1
ωit
R < Rit+1 so that
the borrowing constraints are strictly binding.
From now on, we focus on the case of θ ∈ (0, θ¯). Let Sit ≡ (1 − η)si,ht + ηsi,et denote
aggregate saving. As ωit is the individual’s income when young and aggregate income of
young individuals, the individuals’ and aggregate saving rates are,
si,ht
ωit
= β − (1− β)ω
i
t+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
=
βAi
m+Ai
and
∂
si,ht
ωit
∂m
< 0, (18)
si,et
ωit
= β − (1− β)ω
i
t+1
ωit
1
Ri,et
=
βBi
m+Bi
and
∂
si,ht
ωit
∂m
< 0, (19)
Sit
ωit
= β − (1− β)ω
i
t+1
ωit
(
1− η
Ri,ht
+
η
Ri,et
)
=
β(m+AiBi)
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
and
∂
Sit
ωit
∂m
< 0. (20)
Let υi,jt ≡ ∂ ln s
i,j
t
∂ lnRi,jt
denote the interest elasticity of saving for individual j and Υit ≡ ∂ lnS
i
t
∂ lnRi,ht
denote the elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the loan rate under IFA.
Lemma 1. υi,ht =
m
Ai
and υi,et =
m
Bi
are linear in m. Iff θi < θ¯, Υit > 0 and rises in m.
In subsections 2.2 and 2.3, we analyze the distortions of financial frictions on interest
rates and output with inelastic saving (m = 0) and elastic saving (m > 0), respectively.
2.2 The Equilibrium with Inelastic Savings: m = 0
The binding borrowing constraints depress aggregate credit demand and the loan rate
is lower than the social rate of return. According to equation (7), the positive spread
makes the equity rate higher than the social rate of return. Thus, financial frictions
create a wedge between the private and the social rates of return, ψit =
Ri,ht
Rit+1
= Ai <
1 <
Ri,et
Rit+1
= Bi. A lower θi leads to a larger the interest rate wedge. We call this the
financial-underdevelopment effect and measure it by 1− ψit.
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In the case of interest-inelastic saving, the saving rates are independent of θi,
si,jt
ωit
=
Sit
ωit
= β, according to equations (18)-(20). Since domestic investment is fully financed by
aggregate saving, financial frictions do not distort investment and output. See equations
(11) and (16). In the steady state, output is independent of θi, Y iIFA =
LωiIFA
1−α =
1+
1−αR
−ρ.
2.3 The Equilibrium with Elastic Savings: m > 0
Similar as in subsection 2.2, financial frictions distort interest rates through the financial
underdevelopment effect. In the case of interest-elastic saving, the interest rate distortion
depresses the household saving,
∂
s
i,h
t
ωit
∂θi
> 0, and raises the entrepreneurial saving,
∂
s
i,e
t
ωit
∂θi
< 0.
See equations (18)-(19). According to equation (20), a lower θi leads to a lower aggregate
saving rate,
∂
Sit
ωit
∂θi
> 0, implying that the distortion on household saving dominates that on
entrepreneurial saving.4 As domestic investment is financed purely by aggregate saving,
financial frictions depress investment and output. We call this the elastic saving effect.5
According to equations (18)-(20), it is stronger for a larger m.
Proposition 1. For θi ∈ [0, θ¯), the borrowing constraint is binding and there is a unique
and stable steady state in country i with the wage at ωiIFA =
(
ΛiIFA
R
)ρ
. There is a wedge
between the private and social rates of return, Ri,ht < R
i
t+1 < R
i,e
t . In the steady state, the
loan rate rises and the equity rate falls in θi. If β = 1 or  = 0, m = 0 and output is
independent of θi; if β < 1 and  > 0, m > 0 and output rises in θi.
3 International Capital Mobility
Under full capital mobility, individuals are allowed to lend and make direct investments
globally. Without loss of generality, we assume that country N is more financially devel-
oped, 0 ≤ θS < θN ≤ θ¯. We first solve the equilibrium allocation analytically and show
that the steady-state patterns of international capital flows under full capital mobility in
our model are consistent with the three empirical facts mentioned in the introduction.
Let Φit and Ω
i
t denote the aggregate outflows of financial capital and FDI from country
i in period t, respectively, with negative values indicating capital inflows. Financial capital
outflows reduce the aggregate credit capital used for domestic investment, Di,ht = (1 −
η)si,ht − Φit, while FDI outflows reduce the aggregate equity capital used for domestic
investment, Di,et = ηs
i,e
t − Ωit. Therefore, FDI flows raise the aggregate credit demand in
4This result can be proved by using the Jensen’s Inequality theorem. See appendix B.1.
5von Hagen and Zhang (2009, 2011) develop a model with heterogenous projects and show that
financial frictions distort aggregate investment among projects with different productivity and thus,
aggregate output is inefficiently low. Although output is distorted through different channels in the
current paper and in von Hagen and Zhang (2009, 2011), the implications of capital mobility are identical.
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the host country and reduce that in the parent country. With these changes, the analysis
in section 2 carries through for the cases of capital mobility, due to the (log-)linearity
of preferences, projects, and borrowing constraints. Financial capital flows equalize loan
rates and FDI flows equalize equity rates in the two countries. Credit and equity markets
clear in each country as well as globally. To summarize,
ΦSt + Φ
N
t = Ω
S
t + Ω
N
t = 0, R
S,h
t = R
N,h
t = R
∗,h
t , R
S,e
t = R
N,e
t = R
∗,e
t ,
Kit+1 = (1− η)si,ht + ηsi,et − (Φit + Ωit) = λit(ηsi,et − Ωit) .
The remaining conditions for market equilibrium in each country are the same as under
IFA.
At the world level, aggregate revenue of capital in period t+ 1 is distributed to house-
holds and entrepreneurs as the returns to their respective savings,
(1− η)R∗,ht
∑
i∈{N,S}
si,ht + ηR
∗,e
t
∑
i∈{N,S}
si,et =
∑
i∈{N,S}
Rit+1K
i
t+1 = ρL
∑
i∈{N,S}
ωit+1.
Substituting away si,jt with equation (5), we get the world-level reward splitting rule,
(1− η)R∗,ht + ηR∗,et =
ωwt+1
ωwt
R, where ωwt ≡
ωSt + ω
N
t
2
. (21)
Lemma 2. Under full capital mobility, there is a unique and stable steady state.6
Let XFCM denote the steady-state value of variable X under full capital mobility.
Define a time-invariant auxiliary variable Z iFCM ≡
(ψiFCM−ψiIFA)m+B
i
m+1
(ψiFCM−ψiIFA)m+B
i
m+1
+Bi η
(1−η)
Ri,eIFA. The
solution to the equilibrium allocation is,
Ri,et =
ωwt+1
ωwt
(Ri,eIFA −Z iFCM), (22)
Ri,ht =
ωwt+1
ωwt
(
Ri,hIFA +
η
1− ηZ
i
FCM
)
, (23)
ψit = ψ
i
FCM =
(1− θi)R∗,hFCM
R∗,eFCM
+ θi, (24)
ωit+1 =
(
1− θi
R∗,et
+
θi
R∗,ht
)ρ
, (25)
Φit = (1− η)βωit
(
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
R∗,ht
)
, (26)
Ωit = ηβω
i
t
(
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA
R∗,et
)
, (27)
Ωit + Φ
i
t = βω
i
t
{
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
[
η
Ri,eIFA
R∗,et
+ (1− η)R
i,h
IFA
R∗,ht
]}
. (28)
6Zhang (2013) compares the stability property under financial integration in the current setting and
in the setting of Matsuyama (2004). The symmetry breaking does not arise in the current setting.
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Under full capital mobility, the steady-state interest rates and capital flows are,
Ri,eFCM = R
i,e
IFA −Z iFCM , Ri,hFCM = Ri,hIFA +
η
1− ηZ
i
FCM , (29)
ΦiFCM = (1− η)βωiFCM
(
1− R
i,h
IFA
R∗,hFCM
)
= ηβωiFCM
Z iFCM
R∗,hFCM
, (30)
ΩiFCM = ηβω
i
FCM
(
1− R
i,e
IFA
R∗,eFCM
)
= −ηβωiFCM
Z iFCM
R∗,eFCM
, (31)
ΦiFCM + Ω
i
FCM = ηβω
i
FCMZ iFCM
(R∗,eFCM −R∗,hFCM)
R∗,eFCMR
∗,h
FCM
. (32)
Proposition 2. In the steady state under full capital mobility, the world interest rates
are R∗,hFCM ∈ (RS,hIFA, RN,hIFA) and R∗,eFCM ∈ (RN,eIFA, RS,eIFA), implying the partial convergence
in the relative loan rate, ψSIFA < ψ
S
FCM < ψ
N
FCM < ψ
N
IFA. Aggregate output is higher in
country N than in country S. The gross and net capital flows are ΦSFCM > 0 > Φ
N
FCM ,
ΩSFCM < 0 < Ω
N
FCM , and Φ
S
FCM + Ω
S
FCM > 0 > Φ
N
FCM + Ω
N
FCM . The gross international
investment return sums up to zero in each country, ΦiFCMR
∗,h
FCM + Ω
i
FCMR
∗,e
FCM = 0.
With a higher level of financial development, country N imports financial capital,
exports FDI, and receives net capital inflows. Since the rate of return on its foreign as-
set (FDI outflow) exceeds the interest rate paid for its foreign liability (financial capital
inflow), R∗,eFCM > R
∗,h
FCM , country N receives a positive net international investment in-
come, ΦNFCM(R
∗,h
FCM − 1) + ΩNFCM(R∗,eFCM − 1) = ΦNFCMR∗,hFCM + ΩNFCMR∗,eFCM − (ΦNFCM +
ΩNFCM) = −(ΦNFCM + ΩNFCM) > 0, despite its negative international investment positions,
ΦNFCM + Ω
N
FCM < 0. Thus, our model predictions are consistent with the three empirical
observations mentioned in the introduction.
In the following, we use this analytical framework to address the aggregate implications
of capital mobility. Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 focus on the output and welfare implications,
if both countries are initially in the steady state under IFA before capital mobility is
allowed from period t = 0 on. Subsection 3.3 analyzes how the patterns of capital flows
may change or even reverse along its convergence path if country S is initially below its
steady state under IFA.
3.1 The Output Implications of Full Capital Mobility
Let us start with the case of inelastic saving (m = 0). Since the output implications
are qualitatively identical in the case of either  = 0 or β = 1, we focus on the case of
 = 0 as follows. Individuals save a fraction β of labor income when young and financial
frictions do not affect output under IFA, Y iIFA =
1
1−αR
−ρ. Upon full capital mobility in
period t = 0, aggregate saving is the same as under IFA, Si0 = βω
i
0 = βω
i
IFA, and net
capital flows reallocate the funds for investment from country S to country N, which has
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two consequences on output. First, output in country S (N) is lower (higher) in period
t = 1 than before; second, given the concave aggregate production with respect to capital
at the country level, world output is lower than under IFA, because net capital flows are
in equilibrium from country S where the MPK is high to country N where the MPK is
low.
Corollary 1. In the case of interest-inelastic saving, from period t = 1 on, output in
country S and world output are lower than in the steady state under IFA.
Under IFA, financial frictions do not distort investment so that steady-state output is
the same in the two countries, even though they differ in the level of financial development.
Capital mobility breaks the initial symmetry in the two countries in the sense that net
capital flows are “uphill” in the new steady state, leading to world output losses, which is
also present in Matsuyama (2004). This is a typical result of the theory of second best. In
the presence of domestic financial frictions, capital account liberalization causes capital
to flow to the country with the higher interest rates rather than to the country with the
higher MPK. Obviously, the output responses at the country and the world level depends
on the size of net capital flows, |Ωit + Φit|.
In the case of elastic saving (m > 0), besides the direct impact on output through cross-
country capital reallocation, full capital mobility also has an indirect impact on output
through aggregate saving. Take country S as an example. Financial capital outflows
reduce the domestic credit supply and FDI inflows raise the domestic credit demand.
Both push up the loan rate and domestic households save more. Net capital outflows
reduce the domestic credit supply and the rising competition from foreign entrepreneurs
reduces the MPK. Both push down the equity rate and domestic entrepreneurs save less.
The opposite applies for country N. Thus, changes in aggregate savings depend on the
size of gross capital flows, |Ωit|+ |Φit|. The aggregate saving rate in country i is,
Sit
ωit
=
(1− η)si,ht + ηsi,et
ωit
= β − (1− β)ω
i
t+1
ωit
(
1− η
R∗,ht
+
η
R∗,et
)
. (33)
As shown in subsection 2.3, the aggregate saving rate is higher in the more financially
developed country under IFA,
SNIFA
ωNIFA
>
SSIFA
ωSIFA
. Full capital mobility leads to the cross-
country equalization of the interest rates, implying that the aggregate saving rates also
equalize in the steady state, i.e.,
SSIFA
ωSIFA
<
SSFCM
ωSFCM
=
SNFCM
ωNFCM
<
SNIFA
ωNIFA
, and thus, full capital
mobility also indirectly affects output in the two countries through its effects on savings.
Proposition 3. Let κ ≡ 1−
√
1−4m2(1−η)η
2
< 1
2
. For η ∈ (0, 0.5), there are three scenarios:7
1. if m ∈ (0, 1), Y SFCM > Y SIFA for θS ∈ (0, κ), and Y NFCM > Y NIFA for θN ∈ (κ, θ¯);
7The characterization for the case of η ∈ (0.5, 1) is slightly different and available in the proof.
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2. if m ∈ (1, 1
2
√
η(1−η)), Y
S
FCM > Y
S
IFA for θ
S ∈ (0, κ) ∪ (1 − κ, θ¯), and Y NFCM > Y NIFA
for θN ∈ (κ, 1− κ);
3. if m > 1
2
√
η(1−η) , Y
S
FCM > Y
S
IFA.
As explained above, a larger m implies that aggregate saving is more interest-elastic.
The rise in aggregate saving in country S is more likely to exceed net capital outflows so
that domestic investment can be higher than under IFA and so can output in country S.
Full capital mobility affects world output through both the direct and the indirect
channel. First, “uphill” net capital flows directly lead to cross-country capital reallocation,
which reduces world output. Second, both financial capital and FDI flows indirectly affect
aggregate saving at the country level. For θS < θN , saving is more elastic in country S so
that the rise in aggregate saving of country S dominates the decline in country N. Thus,
world saving rises and so does world output. The size of the negative, direct effect depends
on the size of net capital flows, while the size of the positive, indirect effect depends on the
size of the gross capital flows. Thus, it is possible that full capital mobility raises world
output, despite “uphill” net capital flows. Since the indirect effect essentially results from
the elastic saving, its size depends on the interest elasticity of aggregate saving. According
to Lemma 1, the higher m, the more elastic the aggregate saving, the larger the indirect
effect, the more likely full capital mobility raises world output.
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Figure 1: Comparing Steady-State Output under IFA and under Full Capital Mobility
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We present a numerical example for illustration. We set the population share of
entrepreneurs at η = 10%, the share of labor income in aggregate output, 1 − α = 64%,
and the patience factor β = 0.4. We consider two alternative cases with  ∈ {1, 0.2} and
correspondingly, m ∈ {0.53, 0.18}.
Given θN = θ¯, the upper-left and upper-right panels of figure 1 show the steady-
state output levels in the two countries under full capital mobility versus under IFA, with
θS ∈ [0, θ¯) on the horizontal axes. Given the parameter values, full capital mobility strictly
raises steady-state output in country N, while it raises steady-state output in country S
if θS is below the threshold value θˆS. The lower-left and lower-right panels show the
percentage changes of steady-state world output under full capital mobility versus under
IFA,
(
Y wFCM
Y wIFA
− 1
)
100. For a large m, the output gains in country N always exceed the
output losses (if any) in country S so that world output is higher than under IFA; for
a small m, there exist two threshold values θ˜S1 and θ˜
S
2 such that, for θ
S ∈ (θ˜S1 , θ˜S2 ), full
capital mobility reduces steady-state world output, while, for θS ∈ (0, θ˜S1 ) ∪ (θ˜S2 , θ¯), it
raises steady-state world output.8
3.2 The Welfare Implications of Full Capital Mobility
Given the OLG structure, the model economy converges rather quickly to the new steady
state upon allowing full capital mobility in period t = 0. Thus, we focus on the short-
run and the long-run welfare impacts of full capital mobility by analyzing the welfare
responses of the generations born in period t = 0 and t→∞, respectively.
When young, an individual receives the labor income, consumes a fraction (1− β) of
lifetime income, and saves the rest; when old, it consumes the financial income and the
labor income. Its lifetime welfare is represented by the indirect utility,
ui,jt =W
i,j
t (R
i,j
t )
β =
(
ωit + 
ωit+1
Ri,jt
)
(Ri,jt )
β. (34)
As shown above, full capital mobility affects the interest rates and output in both coun-
tries. Accordingly, the individual’s welfare is affected through three channels, i.e., the
financial return channel, (Ri,jt )
β, the human wealth (the present value of future labor
income) channel, 
ωit+1
Ri,jt
, and the (current) labor income channel, ωit.
• The smaller β is, the less patient the individual is, the less it saves when young, the
less the lifetime welfare depends on the financial return. Thus, impatience dampens
the welfare impacts of full capital mobility via the financial return channel.
• The larger  is, the larger the future labor income is, the more the lifetime welfare
depends on the human wealth, which is affected positively by the future labor income
8Appendix B.3 shows the output implications under the alternative scenarios of capital mobility.
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and negatively by the relevant interest rate. Thus, a larger future labor endowment
amplifies the welfare impacts via the human wealth channel.
• Allowing β < 1 and  > 0 leads to m > 0 and interest-elastic saving so that full
capital mobility may raise or reduce output in country S and globally, depending on
θS. Thus, the presence of impatience and a positive future labor endowment may
magnify or dampen the welfare impacts via the two labor income channels.9
In the following, we focus on the welfare impacts of full capital mobility in the presence
of output gains in country S, i.e., β < 1,  > 0, θS < θˆ, and θN = θ¯.
Consider entrepreneurs in country S first. For the generation born in period t = 0, the
decline in the equity rate, RS,e0 < R
S,e
IFA, and the rise in labor income, ω
S
1 > ω
S
0 , tends to
raise their welfare through the human wealth channel; the decline in the equity rate tends
to reduce their welfare through the financial return channel. The smaller β, the smaller
the financial return effect; the larger , the stronger the human wealth effect. In these
cases, they are more likely to be better off. For the generation born in period t→∞, the
output gains, ωSFCM > ω
S
IFA, tend to raise their welfare additionally through two labor
income channels. The larger m is, the larger the output gains, the stronger the welfare
gains via two labor income channels, the more likely they are better off.
Let us then consider households in country S. For the generation born in period t = 0,
the rise in the loan rate, RS,h0 > R
S,h
IFA, tends to raise their welfare through the financial
return channel; the rises in the loan rate and labor income affect the human wealth in the
opposite way. Rewrite their indirect utility as uS,h0 = ω
S
0 (R
i,j
t )
β + ωS1 (R
i,j
t )
β−1. Overall,
the larger β, the more patient they are, the more the financial return matters for their
welfare the more likely they are better off. For generation born in period t → ∞, the
output gains raise their welfare through the two labor income channels. As mentioned
above, the larger m is, the larger the output gains, the more likely they are better off.
The welfare implications for country N can be addressed by the same logic. Given
θN = θ¯, full capital mobility raises output in country N. For the generation born in period
t = 0, the changes in the interest rates tend to reduce (raise) the welfare of households
(entrepreneurs) through the financial return channel, while the rise in labor income tends
to make everyone better off through the human wealth channel. For the generation born in
period t →∞, the output gains tend to make everyone better off through the two labor
income channels. Similar as mentioned for country S, the magnitudes of the financial
return effect and the labor income effects are affected by β and .
In short, full capital mobility affects welfare at the individual level through the three
channels and the net welfare impact depends on the relative size of different factors. We
show the results in the numerical example with the same parameter values as in subsection
3.1. In particular, we set β = 0.4 and  = 1. Figure 2 shows the percentage differences in
9See appendix B.4 for detailed welfare analysis in the case of inelastic saving.
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welfare under full capital mobility versus under IFA. The dashed lines show the welfare
changes for generation t = 0,
(
ui,j0
ui,jIFA
− 1
)
100, and the solid lines for generation t → ∞,(
ui,jFCM
ui,jIFA
− 1
)
100. Changes in the welfare of generation t = 0 (t→∞) reflect the short-run
(long-run) welfare implications. The upper (lower) panels show the relevant variables in
country S (N) and the horizontal axes denote θS ∈ (0, θ¯).
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Figure 2: Percentage Changes in the Short-Run and Long-Run welfare:  = 1 and β = 0.4.
As we are interested in the parameter region with output gains, let us focus on the
interval with θS close to zero. According to the lower-left panel, the decline in the loan
rate dominates the rise in the human wealth so that households of generation t = 0 in
country N are worse off than under IFA; for generation t → ∞, the rise in the labor
incomes in both periods of life dominates the decline in the loan rate so that households
are better off than under IFA. Thus, full capital mobility has opposite welfare effects
for individuals belonging to different generations. According to the lower-middle panel,
the rise in the equity rate and in human wealth makes entrepreneurs of all generations
better off. Thus, full capital mobility has opposite welfare effects on households and
entrepreneurs in generation t = 0. Such opposite welfare impacts in the intergenerational
and intergenerational dimensions are also present in country S.
Define the social welfare as the weighted sum of individual welfare, U it = (1− η)ui,ht +
ηui,et . The dashed line and the solid line in the upper-right (lower-right) panel show the
percentage changes in the social welfare of generation t = 0 and t→∞ in country S (N).
Despite opposite welfare effects on individuals in the same generation, full capital mobility
raises social welfare both in the short run and in the long run. Essentially, the output
gains are key to social welfare gains. In the current setting, full capital mobility receives
support from entrepreneurs and opposition from households of generation t = 0 in country
N. One can make Pareto improvements by taxing entrepreneurs to make households in
generation t = 0 as well off as under IFA. Similar results hold for country S.
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3.3 Full Capital Mobility and Economic Convergence
The analysis in subsections 3.1 and 3.2 is based on the assumption that both countries are
initially in the steady state under IFA before capital mobility is allowed in period t = 0.
In this subsection, we assume that country N is initially in the steady state, KN0 = K
N
IFA,
but country S is below the steady state under IFA, KS0 < K
S
IFA. By doing so, we address
the interactions between international capital flows, domestic capital accumulation, and
financial development along the convergence path of country S.
As shown in subsections 2.1-2.3, a lower level of capital KS0 < K
S
IFA ≤ KNIFA = KN0
tends to keep the interest rates higher in country S through the neoclassical effect, while
a lower level of financial development θS < θN tends to keep the loan rate lower and
the equity rate higher in country S through the financial-underdevelopment effect. Thus,
the equity rate is initially higher in country S so that it receives FDI inflows in period
t = 0, while the loan rate can be initially higher or lower in country S, depending on the
relative size of the neoclassical effect and the financial-underdevelopment effect. Thus,
the direction of financial capital flows is ambiguous.
Lemma 3. Given 0 ≤ θS < θN , there exists two threshold values KS0 < K¯S0 < KSFCM .
If KS0 < K
S
0 , Φ
S
0 < 0; if K
S
0 > K
S
0 , Φ
S
0 > 0. If K
S
0 < K¯
S
0 , Φ
S
0 + Ω
S
0 < 0; if K
S
0 > K¯
S
0 ,
ΦS0 + Ω
S
0 > 0. Both K
S
0 and K¯
S
0 increase in θ
S.
The intuitions behind Lemma 3 can be shown in a numerical exercise with the same
parameter values as in subsection 3.2. Take the case of θS = 0.4 as an example. In the
left panel of figure 3, the dashed curve, the dash-dot curve, and the solid curve show
the levels of financial capital flows, FDI flows, and net capital flows in period t = 0 as
the functions of KS0 , respectively. The horizontal axis denotes K
S
0 ∈ (0, KSIFA). The two
threshold values, KS0 and K¯
S
0 , are defined as the level of initial capital in country S where
ΦS0 = 0 and Φ
S
0 + Ω
S
0 = 0.
Let us start with KS0 < K
S
0 . Such a sufficiently low level of capital ensures that the
neoclassical effect dominates the financial underdevelopment effect and the loan rate is
initially higher in country S. Besides FDI inflows, country S also receives financial capital
inflows in period t = 0, i.e., ΦS0 ,Ω
S
0 < 0. In the right panel of figure 3, the thick solid curve
and the dashed curve show the value of capital in country S in period t = 1 under full
capital mobility, KS1,FCM , and under IFA, K
S
1,IFA, respectively; the thin solid curve shows
the aggregate saving in country S under full capital mobility, SS0,FCM , and the thin solid
line is the 45◦ line. The horizontal axis denotes KS0 ∈ (0, KSIFA). Under IFA, domestic
investment is financed by aggregate saving, KS1,IFA = S
S
0,IFA. Under full capital mobility,
domestic investment is the difference between aggregate saving and net capital outflows,
KS1,FCM = S
S
0,FCM − (ΦS0 + ΩS0 ). Besides directly raising domestic investment, financial
capital and FDI inflows indirectly depress aggregate savings through the interest rate
channels, SS0,FCM < S
S
0,IFA. Given θ
S = 0.4, the interest elasticity of aggregate saving is
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Figure 3: Patterns of Capital Flows and Economic Convergence
small so that the decline in aggregate savings is overcompensated by net capital inflows.
Thus, domestic investment is higher than under IFA, KS1,FCM > K
S
1,IFA, and full capital
mobility speeds up the convergence in country S.
If KS0 ∈ (KS0 , K¯S0 ), the neoclassical effect is dominated by the financial underdevelop-
ment effect so that the loan rate is initially lower in country S. Thus, country S witnesses
financial capital outflows and FDI inflows in period t = 0, i.e., ΦS0 > 0 > Ω
S
0 . Given
KS0 < K¯
S
0 , the neoclassical effect is still strong so that the loan rate is initially a bit
lower in country S. Thus, the size of financial capital outflows is small and dominated by
FDI inflows. So, country S still receives net capital inflows, ΦS0 + Ω
S
0 < 0. Furthermore,
FDI inflows depress entrepreneurial saving while financial capital outflows raise household
saving through the interest rate channel. If KS0 is slightly higher than K
S
0 , the loan rate
is slightly lower in country S and full capital mobility only leads to a small rise in the
loan rate and household saving. Thus, the decline in entrepreneurial saving dominates
so that SS0,FCM < S
S
0,IFA. If K
S
0  KS0 , the rise in household saving dominates so that
SS0,FCM > S
S
0,IFA. As net capital inflows always raise domestic investment in period t = 0,
full capital mobility speeds up the convergence in country S.
If KS0 > K¯
S
0 , the neoclassical effect is significantly dominated by financial underde-
velopment effect so that financial capital outflows exceed FDI inflows and country S has
net capital outflows in period t = 0. As mentioned in the previous case, financial capital
outflows rise in KS0 and so do net capital outflows and aggregate saving. As shown in the
right panel of figure 3, there exists a threshold value KˆS0 such that, for K
S
0 ∈ (K¯S0 , KˆS0 ),
the rise in aggregate saving dominates net capital outflows so that domestic investment
in period t = 0 is still higher than under IFA; for KS0 ∈ (KˆS0 , KSIFA), domestic invest-
ment is lower than under IFA and full capital mobility slows down capital accumulation.
Eventually, country S converges to a steady state with a lower level of capital.
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Essentially, it is elastic saving that creates the possibility of output gains in the pres-
ence of net capital outflows. If saving is interest-inelastic, i.e., m = 0, net capital outflows
directly reduce domestic investment in period t = 0 without affecting saving. Thus,
domestic investment is lower than under IFA. In other words, KˆS0 coincides with K¯
S
0 .
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Figure 4: Threshold Values under Full Capital Mobility
In the left panel of figure 4, the dash-dotted curve and the dashed curve show two
threshold values, KS0 and K¯
S
0 , as the functions of θ
S in the space of (KS, θS). The
solid thin and thick curves show the steady-state value of capital under IFA and under
full capital mobility, KSIFA and K
S
FCM , as the functions of θ
S, respectively. Given the
assumption of θS ∈ (0, θ¯) and KS0 ∈ (0, KSIFA), only the points to the left of the thin solid
curve denoted by KSIFA are the relevant starting points for our analysis.
Given θS = 0.4 and the initial value of KS0 as represented by point A, K
S
t rises over
time along the flat path and sequentially crosses the two threshold values as represented
by points T and U where financial capital flows and net capital flows change directions.
Region D-O refers to the region with Downhill net flows and One-way gross flows, region
D-T refers to the region with Downhill net flows and Two-way gross flows, and region
U-T refers to the region with Uphill net flows and Two-way gross flows.
In the right panel of figure 4, the dashed curve and the dash-dotted curve show two
threshold value, K¯S0 and Kˆ
S
0 , as the functions of θ
S in the space of (KS, θS), respectively.
If country S starts from point A, given a constant θS = 0.4, full capital mobility creates
output gains there if KSt is in region OG (the region to the left of the dash-dotted curve);
if KSt enters in region OL (the region between the dash-dotted curve and the thin solid
curve), full capital mobility leads to output losses.
Since country S always receives FDI inflows, the direction of net capital flows along
the convergence path depends essentially on the direction and the size of financial capital
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flows. Our model gives two theoretical predictions on the direction of financial capital
flows. First, given the level of financial development, θS, the lower the initial capital
stock, KS0 , the stronger the neoclassical effect, the faster the economic growth rate, and
the more likely country S receives financial and net capital inflows. So far, our analysis
is based on the time-invariant level of financial development. Suppose that θS rises over
time, as shown by the upward-sloping convergence path starting from point A in the left
panel of figure 4. Our second prediction is that, the faster the rise in θS (the steeper the
convergence path from point A), the stronger the financial development effect, the higher
the loan rate in country S, the more likely it receives financial and net capital inflows.
3.4 Some Suggestive Empirical Evidence
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full-fledged structural estimation for the
determination of capital flows in emerging economies. Instead, we offer some suggestive
evidence supporting the two predictions mentioned at the end of subsection 3.3.
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Figure 5: Capital Flows in Percentage of GDP: CEECs versus ASEAN-5
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) show that, during the period from 1995-2004, the
group of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) on average had current account
deficits of over 5.5% of GDP, while the group of emerging Asian economies (EAEs) on
average had current account surpluses of over 3% of GDP. Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2009)
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obtain similar results. The upper panels of figure 5 show financial capital flows (denoted
by FCF), FDI flows (denoted by FDI), and net capital flows (denoted by NCF) of CEECs
and ASEAN-5 as a percentage of GDP between 1995-2011.10 Note that the positive values
represent capital outflows. CEECs received net capital inflows, FDI inflows, and financial
capital inflows in most years. ASEAN-5 received FDI inflows but it had financial capital
outflows and net capital outflows after 1998. The lower panels of figure 5 decompose
financial capital flows as a percentage of GDP into private financial capital flows (denoted
by PFCF), the empirical counterpart to the financial capital flows in our model, and
changes in net foreign reserves (denoted by CNFR). Note that a positive value of CNFR
represents an increase in net foreign reserves. Except the period of economic transition
in 1995-1996, CEECs had the relatively stable rises in net foreign reserves. As widely
documented in the literature, the net foreign reserves in ASEAN-5 rose at an increasing
speed after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. CEECs received private financial capital inflows
at the increasing speed in 2001-2008, while the ASEAN-5 witnessed private financial
capital outflows in the most of the sample period after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
According to our theoretical predictions at the end of subsection 3.3, the higher the
economic growth rate (the neoclassical effect) and the faster the rise in the level of financial
development (the financial development effect), the more likely an economy is to receive
financial capital inflows. Following the literature (Arezki and Bru¨ckner, 2012; Chinn,
Eichengreen, and Ito, 2013), the level of financial development is measured by domestic
credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (hereafter, the credit-to-GDP ratio) and
10CEECs refer to Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, which have become the member states of European Union by the end of 2012. We focus
on CEECs’ post-transition period, i.e., 1995-2011. According to IMF (2010), “emerging Asia” refers to
China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Vietnam. As our model predictions apply to developing economies, we exclude Hong Kong and Singapore.
The rest of nine emerging Asian economies are referred as EAE-9. China and India impose strict capital
controls on financial capital flows (Habermeier, Kokenyne, and Baba, 2011; Hutchison, Pasricha, and
Singh, 2012; Klein, 2012), while Korea and Taiwan moved from middle-income to high-income economies
in 1995-2011. In order to focus more closely on developing economies with relatively free capital mobility,
we first test our results on ASEAN-5, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Then, we conduct the robustness check by augmenting the sample of ASEAN-5 with China, Indian,
Korea, and Taiwan. Appendix B.5 shows that the qualitative results hold across various samples.
Data for capital flows are obtained from the annual data of financial account in the Balance of Payments
from IMF International Financial Statistics. FDI flows are the sum of the entries under direct investment
abroad and direct investment in reporting economy; changes in net foreign reserves (CNFR) are the entries
under reserves and related items; private financial capital flows (PFCF) are the sum of the entries under
portfolio investment assets and liabilities, under net financial derivatives, and under other investment
assets and liabilities; financial capital flows are the sum of PFCF and CNFR; net capital flows are the
sum of FDI flows and financial capital flows. According to the definition by IMF, a positive value of
capital flows in the balance of payments represents capital inflows, while a positive value of capital flows
is defined as capital outflows in our model. In order to be consistent with our model definition, the signs
of the five time series computed above are reversed.
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the neoclassical effect is measured by the growth rate of real GDP per capita. Data
are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Figure 6 shows the
evolutions of the two variables in 1995-2011 at the regional level. Due to the credit crunch
after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the credit-to-GDP ratio of ASEAN-5 fell dramatically
from close 100% in 1997 to 60% in 2001. For the next six years, the ratio remained at
that level. In contrast, following the 2004 EU enlargement, the adoption of EU laws
and directives has significantly improved financial sector quality in CEECs by upgrading
their legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework to the same standard as in the Western
Europe. Furthermore, the significant dominance of foreign banks in the CEECs’ financial
markets also improved the quality of domestic banking sectors (Herrmann and Winkler,
2009a,b). The credit-to-GDP ratio of CEECs rose dramatically from below 30% in 2002 to
close 60% in 2008. Meanwhile, the real per capita GDP growth was also higher in CEECs
than in ASEAN-5 in 1998-2008. These facts are consistent with our model predictions.
We use a simple panel data model to test our predictions in the two regions,
PFCFi,t = γ1gi,t + γ2∆FDi,t + γ3gw,t + γ4FDi,t−1 + γ5 lnGDPi,t−1 + γ6D98 + φi + µi,t,
(35)
where the dependent variable PFCF it refers to the ratio of private financial capital flows
over GDP in country i and year t; gi,t and gw,t refer to the year-t real GDP per capita
growth in country i and in the world, respectively; ∆FDi,t = FDi,t − FDi,t−1 refers to
the annual change in the credit-to-GDP ratio in year t; FDi,t−1 and lnGDPi,t−1 are the
lagged values of the credit-to-GDP ratio and the natural logarithm of real per capita
GDP, capturing the initial conditions; D98 is a dummy variable for ASEAN-5 in year
1998, accounting for the Asian financial crisis in 1997;11 φi measures country fixed effects
and µi,t is the error term.
12 The positive (negative) values of PFCF refer to capital
11A dummy variable accounting for the 2009 global financial crisis is not statistically significant at the
10% level when included in the regression.
12The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (2012) measure six broad dimensions of gover-
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outflows (inflows), consistent with the definition in our theoretical model. According to
our model predictions, γ1 and γ2 are expected to take the negative values.
The regression is conducted under four alternative settings. In setting (2), the regres-
sion as described by equation (35) is conducted; in setting (1), the explanatory variables
which are statistically significant at the 5% level in setting (2) are included in the re-
gression. In setting (4), in order to address the potential endogeneity problem between
PFCFi,t, gi,t, and ∆FDi,t, we use the lagged values of real per capita GDP growth gi,t−1
and the annual change in the credit-to-GDP ratio ∆FDi,t−1 together with the current
world growth rate13 gw,t as the instruments for gi,t and ∆FDi,t, and other explanatory
variables in equation (35) are also included in the regression; in setting (3), the explana-
tory variables which are statistically significant at the 5% level in setting (4) are included
in the regression. To facilitate the cross-regional comparison, the regression is conducted
for the respective samples of ten CEECs, ASEAN-5, and all fifteen countries.
Tables 1 reports the panel regression estimates in the four settings for the three sam-
ples. For all samples, the coefficients on per capita GDP growth and the change in credit-
to-GDP ratio, i.e., γ1 and γ2, are statistically significant at the 1% level and negative in
all settings and all samples, consistent with our theoretical predictions.
4 Conclusion
We develop a tractable, two-country, overlapping-generations model and show that cross-
country differences in financial development can explain three recent empirical facts of
international capital flows. International capital mobility may raise output at the country
and the global level even when the less financially developed countries experience net
capital outflows. The reason is that international capital flows not only lead directly to
cross-country reallocation of aggregate saving but also trigger indirectly the adjustment
along the consumption-saving margin. If aggregate saving is sufficiently interest-elastic,
the indirect effect may override the prediction of conventional models in this literature,
i.e., that net capital outflows from less financially developed countries raise output in these
countries and globally. Output gains are more likely, the larger are gross compared to net
capital flows and the larger the difference in the levels of financial development among
the countries under consideration. An obvious question then is whether the patterns of
nance (http://www.govindicators.org) and can be used to control for institutional quality. Mean
years of schooling of adults from the UNDP’s International Human Development Indicators (http:
//hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103006.html) describe the education attainment of population
and can be used to control for the level of human capital. The levels and the annual changes of these
indicators are not statistically significant at the 5% level when included in the regression.
13For the robustness check, instead of using the current world growth rate, we also use the current
growth rate in Euro area for CEECs and the current growth rate in East Asia and Pacific (all income
levels) for ASEAN-5. The qualitative results are the same as using the current world growth rate.
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international capital flows observed in recent years are indeed output improving. Our
model suggests two empirical indicators to consider. The first is the development of labor
productivity after a less financially developed country opens up to international capital
flows. Our model suggests that output gains come with the gains of labor productivity
and, hence, real wages in this country. The second is that output gains come with a
narrowing of the gap between the rate of return on equity and the rate of return on
financial assets (equity premium) in the less financially developed country.
We also show that capital account liberalization may offer a developing country the
short-run benefit of faster capital accumulation but possibly at the long-run cost of a lower
level of output. In order to reduce the cost and exploit the benefit, the developing country
should promote its level of financial development when liberalizing capital account.
We take the level of financial development as given and analyze how its differences
affect capital flows. For future research, we plan to address how economic growth and
various forms of capital flows reshape the level of financial development.
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A Proofs of Propositions, Lemmas, and Corrollary
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Without loss of generality, we suppress the country index for simplicity. According to
equation (5), υjt =
1
ωtR
j
t
ωt+1
β
(1−β)−1
. Using equations (12) and (13) to substitute away Rjt , we get
υht =
m
A and υ
e
t =
m
B which are linear in m.
According to the revenue splitting rule, (1 − η)Rht + ηRet = ωt+1ωt R. The aggregate saving
under IFA is rewritten as St = βωt − (1 − β)ωt+1
[
1−η
Rht
+ ηRet
]
. Let Υt ≡ ∂ lnSt∂ lnRht denote the
elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the loan rate.
Υt =
∂St
∂Rht
Rht
St
= (1− β)ωt+1(1− η)
[
1
(Rht )
2
− 1
(Ret )
2
]
Rht
St
=
(1− β)ωt+1(1− η)
βωt − (1− β)ωt+1
(
1−η
Rht
+ ηRet
) [ 1
Rht
− 1
Ret
Rht
Ret
]
.
Use equations (12) and (13) to substitute away Rjt ,
Υt =
(1− β)(1− η)
(1 + )ρ− (1− β)
(
1−η
m+A +
η
m+B
) [ 1
m+A
− 1
m+B
m+A
m+B
]
=
m(1− η)
1−m
(
1−η
m+A +
η
m+B
) [(m+B)2 − (m+A)2
(m+A)(m+B)2
]
=
m(1− η)
(m+AB)(m+B)
(2m+B+A)(B−A).
Iff θ < θ¯, B > A and Υt > 0, implying that aggregate saving rises in the loan rate.
∂ ln Υ
∂m
=
1
m
− 1
m+B
− 1
m+AB
+
2
(2m+B+A)
=
AB2 −m2
m(m+AB)(m+B)
+
2
(2m+B+A)
=
(B−A)m2 +AB(2m2 + 4Bm+AB+B2)
m(m+AB)(m+B)(2m+B+A)
> 0.
Thus, Υt is positively related to m.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If the borrowing constraints are binding, Ri,ht < R
i
t+1, according to equation (7). We
prove that equations (11)-(17) are the model solution in this case.
At the aggregate level, θiRit+1K
i
t+1 and (1 − θi)Rit+1Kit+1 are paid to households and en-
trepreneurs as the rewards to their respective contributions in the form of credit capital Di,ht
and equity capital Di,et ,
Kit+1 = D
i,h
t +D
i,e
t =
θiRit+1K
i
t+1
Ri,ht
+
(1− θi)Rit+1Kit+1
Ri,et
⇒ θ
i
Ri,ht
+
(1− θi)
Ri,et
=
1
Rit+1
. (36)
1
We call it the investment sharing rule.
Aggregate capital stock consists of aggregate savings of households and entrepreneurs,
Kit+1 = (1− η)si,ht + ηsi,et = βωit − (1− β)ωit+1
(
η
Ri,et
+
1− η
Ri,ht
)
. (37)
According to equations (2), the aggregate reward to capital is Rit+1K
i
t+1 = ρ(1+)ω
i
t+1. Combine
it with equation (37), we get the aggregate capital reward rule
ρ(1 + )ωit+1
Rit+1
= βωit − (1− β)ωit+1
(
η
Ret
+
1− η
Rht
)
. (38)
Let rit+1 ≡
Rit+1
ωit+1
ωit
R
, ri,et ≡ R
i,e
t
ωit+1
ωit
R
, and ri,ht ≡ R
i,h
t
ωit+1
ωit
R
denote the social and the private interest rates
normalized by
ωit+1
ωit
R. The aggregate capital reward rule (38), the reward splitting rule (10),
and the investment sharing rule (36) are simplified as,
1
rit+1
= 1 +m−m
(
1− η
ri,ht
+
η
ri,et
)
1
rit+1
=
θ
ri,ht
+
1− θ
ri,et
1 = (1− η)ri,ht + ηri,et .
Given the parameters θ, η, and m, there exists a unique and time-invariant solution to the
normalized interest rates, ri,ht =
m+Ai
m+1 , r
i,e
t =
m+Bi
m+1 , and r
i
t+1 =
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
(m+1)(m+AiBi)
. Thus, equations
(12)-(14) are the solutions to interest rates. Using equation (14) to substitute away Rit+1 from
the factor reward equation Kit+1 = ρ(1 + )
ωit+1
Rit+1
, we get the solution to aggregate capital stock
(11). Combining equations (1)-(2), the factor prices are
Y it+1 =
 αY
i
t+1
Rit+1
α

α (1−α)Y
i
t+1
ωit+1
1− α

1−α
=
Y it+1
(Rit+1)
α(ωit+1)
1−α ⇒ (Rit+1)α(ωit+1)1−α = 1. (39)
Using equation (14) to substitute away Rit+1, we get the dynamic equation of wages (16) with
the aggregate efficiency indicator Λi.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. First, we prove that equation (22) is the solution to the
equity rate. Define ∆ψit ≡ ψit − ψiIFA. Given the binding borrowing constraints, use ψit = R
i,h
t
Rit+1
and ψiIFA =
Ri,hIFA
RiIFA
to rewrite equation (36) under IFA and under full capital mobility,
ψit
1− θi −
Ri,ht
Ri,et
=
θi
1− θi =
ψiIFA
1− θi −
Ri,hIFA
Ri,eIFA
, ⇒ ∆ψ
i
t
1− θi =
Ri,ht
Ri,et
− R
i,h
IFA
Ri,eIFA
. (40)
Substituting Ri,ht and R
i,h
IFA with R
i,e
t and R
i,e
IFA using the reward splitting rules (21) and (10),
we solve the equity rate from equation (40). Plug the solution to the equity rate into the reward
2
splitting rule (21) to solve for Ri,ht . Using the approach in the proof of Lemma 4 in appendix
B.2.1, we can prove the solutions to financial capital and FDI flows (26) and (27).
Second, we prove that ψit is constant under full capital mobility. Suppose that ψ
i
t is time vari-
ant and so is Z it defined in section 3. According to equation (22), the international equalization
of the equity rate equalization implies that,
RS,eIFA −ZSt = RN,eIFA −ZNt , (41)
∆ψSt =
BS
BN
∆ψNt +
RBSη
1− η
(
1
RN,eIFA
− 1
RS,eIFA
)
. (42)
Using equations (22), (27), and (40), we rewrite the condition, ΩSt + Ω
N
t = 0, into
Ri,eIFA
Ri,et
=
(
1 +
Ri,eIFA
R
1− η
η
∆ψit
Bi
)
ωwt
ωwt+1
, ⇒ ωSt+1∆ψSt
m+BS
BS
+ ωNt+1∆ψ
N
t
m+BN
BN
= 0.
Given the international equalization of the loan rate, Ri,ht = R
∗,h
t , substitute away ω
i
t+1 using
equation (39) and the definition of the relative loan rate,
KSt +KNt = 0, where Kit ≡ (∆ψit + ψiIFA)ρ∆ψit
m+Bi
Bi
, (43)
∂Kit
∂∆ψit
= [(ρ+ 1)∆ψit + ψ
i
t](∆ψ
i
t + ψ
i
IFA)
ρ−1m+Bi
Bi
> 0. (44)
According to equations (43)-(44), ∆ψSt is an implicit function of ∆ψ
N
t , which is downward
sloping and cross the origin point; according to equation (42), ∆ψSt is an implicit function of
∆ψNt , which is upward sloping and has a positive intercept on the vertical axis. Thus, there
must exists a unique and, hence, time-invariant, solution with ∆ψSt > 0 > ∆ψ
N
t .
Finally, we prove the existence of a unique and stable steady state under full capital mobility.
ψit is time-invariant and so is Z it . Let Ri,hFCM ≡ Ri,hIFA+ η1−ηZ iFCM . It is the same across countries,
Ri,hFCM = R
∗,h
FCM . Thus, according to equation (23), the loan rate depends on the dynamics of
the world-average wages. So is the wage in country i,
ωit+1 = (R
i
t+1)
−ρ = (
Ri,ht
ψit
)−ρ = (
ωwt+1
ωwt
R∗,hIFA)
−ρ(ψit)
ρ.
Given the time-invariant relative loan rate, the dynamics of world-average wages are
ωwt+1 =
ωSt+1 + ω
N
t+1
2
= (
ωwt+1
ωwt
R∗,hIFA)
−ρ (ψ
S
FCM )
ρ + (ψNFCM )
ρ
2
,
ωwt+1 =
(
ωwt
R∗,hFCM
)α [
(ψSFCM )
ρ + (ψNFCM )
ρ
2
]1−α
Given α ∈ (0, 1), the phase diagram of the world-average wage is concave. Thus, there ex-
ists a unique and stable steady state. Proportional to wage, aggregate output in country i is
determined by the world output dynamics.
Proof of Proposition 2
3
Proof. According to equation (30), the world credit market clearing condition, ΦSFCM +Φ
N
FCM =
0 implies that
(
1− R
S,h
IFA
R∗,hFCM
)(
1− R
N,h
IFA
R∗,hFCM
)
< 0. Given RS,hIFA < R
N,h
IFA, the world loan rate must
be R∗,hFCM ∈ (RS,hIFA, RN,hIFA). By analogy, we can prove R∗,eFCM ∈ (RN,eIFA, RS,eIFA).
According to equation (29), R∗,hFCM ∈ (RS,hIFA, RN,hIFA) implies ZSFCM > 0 > ZNFCM , which then
implies that ψSFCM > ψ
S
IFA and ψ
N
FCM < ψ
N
IFA. Use the same approach as in the proof of Lemma
4, we can prove the partial convergence of the relative loan rate, ψSIFA < ψ
S
FCM < ψ
N
FCM < ψ
N
IFA.
According to equations (30) and (31), the changes in the interest rates imply that ΦSFCM >
0 > ΦNFCM and Ω
S
FCM < 0 < Ω
N
FCM . Since R
∗,e
FCM > R
∗,h
FCM , the steady-state net capital flows
have the same sign as Z iFCM , according to equation (32). Thus, ZSFCM > 0 > ZNFCM implies
that ΦSFCM + Ω
S
FCM > 0 > Φ
N
FCM + Ω
N
FCM .
According to equations (30) and (31), we get,
R∗,hFCMΦ
i
FCM +R
∗,e
FCMΩ
i
FCM = βηω
i
FCM (Z iFCM −Z iFCM ) = 0.
Proof of Corolarry 1
Proof. Let at ≡ ω
N
t +ω
S
t
2ωIFA
and bt ≡ ω
N
t −ωSt
2ωIFA
+
ΦSt +Ω
S
t
βωIFA
, where t = 0, 1, 2, 3, .... According to the
aggregate resource constraint in country S, net capital outflows cannot exceed aggregate saving,
0 < ΦSt + Ω
S
t < βω
S
t , we get bt ∈ (0, at). In period t ≥ 0, the aggregate investment in the two
countries are ISt = βω
S
t −(ΦSt +ΩSt ) = (at−bt)βωSIFA and INt = βωNt +(ΦSt +ΩSt ) = (at+bt)βωNIFA,
respectively. Given α ∈ (0, 1), bt ∈ (0, at), and ωIFA =
(
β
ρ
)ρ
, the world-average wage is
reformulated into a condensed form,
ωSt+1 + ω
N
t+1
2
=
(
1
ρ
)α [(ISt )α + (INt )α
2
]
⇔ at+1 = (at − bt)
α + (at + bt)
α
2
< (at)
α, (45)
where the last inequality sign results from the Jensen’s Inequality. The wage in period t = 0
is the same in the two countries, ωS0 = ω
N
0 = ωIFA, and, thus, a0 = 1. From period 0 on,
full capital mobility is allowed. According to the inequality in equation (45), a1 < 1. For
t = 1, 2, 3, ..., given bt ∈ (0, at), we have at+1 < (at)α and, thus, the time series of at is below
1, or equivalently,
ωSt +ω
N
t
2 < ωIFA. Thus, the world output is smaller than before period t = 0,
Y St + Y
N
t =
ωSt +ω
N
t
1−α <
2ωIFA
1−α = Y
S
IFA + Y
N
IFA.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The factor price equation (39), the reward splitting rule, (10), and the investment sharing
rule (36) hold under full capital mobility and under IFA,
ωil =
(
Ri,hl
ψil
)−ρ
, ψil =
Ri,hl
Ri,el
(1− θi) + θi, ηRi,el + (1− η)Ri,hl = R. (46)
where l ∈ {IFA, FCM} refers to the scenarios of IFA and full capital mobility, respectively.
Under full capital mobility, the international loan rate equalization and the partial convergence
of the relative loan rate, ψSFCM < ψ
N
FCM , implies that ω
S
FCM < ω
N
FCM , or Y
S
FCM < Y
N
FCM .
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Define ri,hl ≡
Ri,hl
R
and ri,el ≡
Ri,el
R
. According to equations (46), the steady-state wage under
IFA and under full capital mobility is a function of ri,el ,
ωil =
1
Rρ
[
(1− θi)ri,hl
ri,el
+ θi
]ρ
(ri,hl )
−ρ and ri,hl =
1− ηri,el
1− η .
Given θi, if full capital mobility affects the equity rate in country i, the wage and hence output
in this country change accordingly.
T il ≡
∂ωil
∂ri,el
=
ρωilN il
[(1− θi)ri,hl + θiri,el ]ri,el ri,hl
, (47)
where, N il ≡ θi
[
(1− ri,hl )2
η
+
1
1− η
]
− (ri,hl )2. (48)
Thus, T il has the same sign as N il .
According to equations (12)-(13), ri,eIFA =
m+Bi
m+1 and r
i,h
IFA =
m+Ai
m+1 . Evaluate T il in the
steady state under IFA by substituting ri,eIFA and r
i,h
IFA into equation (47)-(48),
T iIFA = ρωiIFA(1 +m)
(θ¯−θi)
1−η
[
θi(1−θi)
η(1−η) −m2
]
(m+Ai)(m+Bi)
[
m+B
(
1− (θ¯−θi)1−η
)] ,
N iIFA =
[
θi(1− θi)
η(1− η) −m
2
]
(θ¯ − θi)
(1− η)
1
(1 +m)2
.
We take the following approach to provide the sufficient conditions on the output implications
of full capital mobility. Consider country N. If θN can make NNIFA ≥ 0, full capital mobility
reduces the steady-state loan rate so that NNFCM > NNIFA ≥ 0. Thus, T NFCM > 0 and T NIFA ≥ 0.
As full capital mobility raises the steady-state equity rate for country N , we get ωNFCM > ω
N
IFA
or Y NFCM > Y
N
IFA. Consider country S. If θ
S can make N SIFA ≤ 0, full capital mobility raises
the steady-state loan rate so that N SFCM < N SIFA ≤ 0. Thus, T SFCM < 0 and T SIFA ≤ 0. As
full capital mobility reduces the steady-state equity rate for country S, we get ωSFCM > ω
S
IFA
or Y SFCM > Y
S
IFA.
It is trivial to prove the general results for θS = 0 and θN = θ¯. If θN = θ¯, NNIFA = 0 so that
full capital mobility raises its steady-state output, Y NFCM > Y
N
IFA. If θ
S = 0, N SIFA ≤ 0 so that
full capital mobility raises its steady-state output, Y SFCM > Y
S
IFA.
For θi ∈ [0, θ¯), the sign of T iIFA depends on that of N iIFA, or, that of
[
θi(1−θi)
η(1−η) −m2
]
.
Figure 7 shows all possible cases on the relative size of θ
i(1−θi)
η(1−η) and m
2 where the three
panels in the first row show the cases with η ∈ (0, 0.5), the two panels in the second row show
the cases with η ∈ (0, 5, 1), and the horizontal axis shows θi ∈ (0, θ¯).
Given η ∈ (0, 0.5), θi(1−θi)η(1−η) ∈ (0, 14η(1−η)) is a hump-shaped function of θi ∈ (0, θ¯). Point H
denotes its highest value 14η(1−η) > 1. Define κ ≡
1−
√
1−4m2(1−η)η
2 .
• If m ∈ (0, 1), there exists a threshold value θ˜1 = κ such that, for θi ∈ (0, θ˜1), N iIFA < 0
and, for θi ∈ (θ˜1, θ¯), the opposite applies.
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Figure 7: Threshold Values under Various Scenarios
• If m ∈ (1, 1
2
√
η(1−η)), there exists two threshold values θ˜1 = κ and θ˜2 = 1 − κ such that
for θi ∈ (θ˜1, θ˜2), N iIFA > 0 and, for θi ∈ (0, θ˜1) ∪ (θ˜2, θ¯), the opposite applies.
• If m > 1
2
√
η(1−η) , for θ
i ∈ (0, θ¯), it holds that N iIFA < 0.
Given η ∈ (0.5, 1), θi(1−θi)η(1−η) ∈ (0, 1) is a monotonically increasing function of θi ∈ (0, θ¯).
• If m ∈ (0, 1), there exists a threshold value θ˜1 = κ such that, for θi ∈ (0, θ˜1), N iIFA > 0
and, for θi ∈ (θ˜1, θ¯), the opposite applies.
• If m > 1, for θi ∈ (0, θ¯), N iIFA < 0.
Using the approach mentioned above, we can provide the sufficient conditions as summarized in
proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Lemma 3 can be proved intuitively as follows. Start from a sufficiently low level of
capital in country S. Under IFA, country S converges to its steady state at a positive growth
rate of output and wage, i.e.,
ωS1
ωS0
> 1, and the growth rate declines in KS0 , due to the decreasing
marginal product of capital (the neoclassical effect); according to Proposition 1, θN > θS implies
RN,hIFA > R
S,h
IFA and, according to equation (13),
ωS1
ωS0
> 1 implies RS,h0 > R
S,h
IFA. Thus, R
S,h
IFA <
min{RN,hIFA, RS,h0 }. By assumption, country N is initially in the steady state under IFA, RN,h0 =
6
RN,hIFA. Under full capital mobility, the cross-country equalization of the loan rate implies that
R∗,h0 > min{RN,h0 , RS,h0 } = {RN,hIFA, RS,h0 }. Thus,
RS,hIFA
R∗,h0
< 1.
Given θS , KS0 is defined as a value of K
S
0 such that
ωS1
ωS0
RS,hIFA
R∗,h0
= 1. If KS0 < K
S
0 , the growth rate
of wage is so high that, despite
RS,hIFA
R∗,h0
< 1,
ωS1
ωS0
RS,hIFA
R∗,h0
> 1 and, according to equation (26), country
S has financial capital inflows,
ΦS0
βωS0
= 1− ωS1
ωS0
RS,hIFA
R∗,h0
< 0. If KS0 > K
S
0 ,
ΦS0
βωS0
= 1− ωS1
ωS0
RS,hIFA
R∗,h0
> 0. As
country S always receives FDI inflows, if KS0 is slightly above K
S
0 , financial capital outflows are
dominated by FDI inflows so that country S still has net capital inflows; according to Proposition
2, country S witnesses net capital outflows in the steady state under full capital mobility. Thus,
there must exist another threshold value K¯S0 ∈ (KS0 ,KSFCM ), such that, for KS0 > K¯S0 , financial
capital outflows exceed FDI inflows so that ΦS0 + Ω
S
0 > 0; for K
S
0 < K¯
S
0 , FDI inflows dominate
so that ΦS0 + Ω
S
0 < 0.
A higher θS implies a higher RS,hIFA so that
RS,hIFA
R∗,h0
tends to be higher, too. Following the
argument mentioned above, it is trivial to show that KS0 and K¯
S
0 rise in θ
S .
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B Other Relevant Issues
B.1 Financial Development and Aggregate Saving in the Case
of Elastic Saving under IFA
Here, we prove intuitively that, under IFA, aggregate saving is a decreasing function of θi
in the case of elastic saving. Let Ri,j ≡ ωit
ωit+1
Ri,jt denote the interest rate normalized by the
the gross growth rate of wage. Define an auxiliary function M(x1, x2, p) ≡ (1 − η)xp1 + ηxp2.
The aggregate saving rate is
Sit
ωit
= β − (1 − β)M(Ri,h, Ri,e,−1), where M(Ri,h, Ri,e,−1) =
1−η
Ri,h
+ η
Ri,e
captures the normalized aggregate human wealth. Given that country N is more
financially developed, 0 < θS < θN < θ¯, the normalized loan rate (equity rate) is higher (lower)
in country N than in country S. Let point S (N) in figure 8 represents the interest rates in
country S (N). According to the reward splitting rule (10), the normalized interest rates are
linearly related, (1 − η)Ri,h + ηRi,e = R. Thus, points S and N are on the same reward
splitting line (the downward-sloping solid line). The convex isoquant represents the aggregate
human wealth, M(Ri,h, Ri,e,−1). A lower isoquant refers to a larger aggregate human wealth,
M(RS,h, RS,e,−1) > M(RN,h, RN,e,−1), and hence a lower aggregate saving rate, SSt
ωSt
<
SNt
ωNt
.
S
N
O Ri,h
Ri,e
Figure 8: Graphic Illustration of the Aggregate Human Wealth Effect
B.2 Partial Capital Mobility
Here, we consider two cases of partial capital mobility. First, free mobility of financial capital
refers to the case where individuals can freely borrow from and lend to foreign individuals but
entrepreneurs are not allowed to make direct investment abroad in the production of capital
goods. Second, free mobility of FDI refers to the case where entrepreneurs are allowed to make
direct investment abroad in the production of capital goods but individuals are not allowed to
borrow from and lend to foreign individuals.
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B.2.1 Free Mobility of Financial Capital
Financial capital flows equalize the loan rate across the border and the credit markets clear in
each country and globally, RS,ht = R
N,h
t = R
∗,h
t , (1−η)si,ht −Φit = (λit−1)ηsi,et , and ΦSt +ΦNt = 0.
The remaining conditions for market equilibrium in each country are the same as under IFA.
The solution to the equilibrium allocation is
Ri,et =
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA, (49)
Ri,ht =
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
ψit − θi
ψiIFA − θi
, (50)
Φit = (1− η)βωit
(
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
Ri,ht
)
= (1− η)βωit
ψit − ψiIFA
ψit − θi
, (51)
ωit+1 =
(
Λit
R
ωit
)α
, where Λit = Λ
i
IFA
1− θi
ψiIFA
1− θi
ψit
, (52)
∂ ln Λit
∂ψit
= − θ
i
ψit(ψ
i
t − θi)
< 0 (53)
The relative loan rate ψit is key to the model mechanism. As the loan rate is initially lower in
country S, RS,hIFA < R
N,h
IFA, financial capital flows from country S to country N in period t = 0,
ΦS0 > 0 > Φ
N
0 , implying that ψ
S
0 > ψ
S
IFA and ψ
N
0 > ψ
N
IFA, according to equation (51). Given
ψSIFA < ψ
N
IFA, financial integration leads to the (partial) convergence of the relative loan rate.
Lemma 4. Under financial capital mobility, there is a unique and stable steady state.14
Proof. The proof consists of three parts. First, we show that the model solution is characterized
by equations (49)-(52). Under free mobility of financial capital, entrepreneurs invest their entire
savings as equity in their projects. Use equation (5) and the investment-equity ratio λit to rewrite
the aggregate domestic investment as
ηsi,et λ
i
t =
η[βωit − (1− β)ω
i
t+1
Ri,et
]
1− θiR
i
t+1
Ri,ht
= Kit+1 = (1 + )ρ
ωit+1
Rit+1
.
Multiplying both sides with
1− θ
iRit+1
R
i,h
t
ηβωit
and using the investment sharing rule (36), we get the
solution to the equity rate (49),
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,et
=
(1 + )ρ
β
ωit+1
ωit
1− θi
ηRi,et
, ⇒ Ri,et =
ωit+1
ωit
R
m+B
m+ 1
=
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA.
14Matsuyama (2004) shows that in the presence of financial market imperfections, financial integration
may lead to symmetry breaking, i.e., financial capital flows may destablize the initial steady state under
IFA so that countries with identical fundamentals may end up with different income levels. Matsuyama
(2004) assumes the fixed investment size of individual project so that aggregate investment adjusts along
the extensive margin. Zhang (2013) shows that Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking results depend critically
on this assumption; in the case of the varying investment size of individual project, aggregate investment
adjusts along the intensive margin and financial integration does not lead to symmetry breaking.
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Combining equations (49), (36), (12), (13) and using the definition of the relative loan rate, we
get the solution to the loan rate (50),
Ri,ht = R
i,e
t
(ψit − θi)
1− θi =
ωit+1
ωit
R
m+A
m+ 1
m+B
m+Ai
(ψit − θi)
1− θi
=
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA +
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
[
ψit − θi
ψiIFA − θi
− 1
]
=
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA +
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
[
ψit − ψiIFA
ψiIFA − θi
]
.
In equilibrium, financial capital outflows are essentially the excess aggregate saving, Φit = S
i
t −
Iit = (1− η)si,ht + ηsi,et −λitηsi,et . Using equation (5), the investment-equity ratio, λit = 1
1−θi R
i
t+1
R
i,h
t
,
and the definition of the relative loan rate, we get the solution to financial capital outflows, (51).
Φit = (1− η)βωit
[
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
]
− ηβωit
[
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,et
]
θi
ψit − θi
= (1− η)βωit
{
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
− η
1− η
[
1− (1− β)
β
ωit+1
ωit
1
Ri,et
]
θi
ψit − θi
}
= (1− η)βωit
{
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
[
(1− β)
β
+
η
1− η
θi
ψit − θi
Ri,ht ω
i
t
ωit+1
− (1− β)
β
η
1− η
θi
(1− θi)
]}
= (1− η)βωit
{
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
[
(1− β)
β
(
1− A
B
)
+
η
1− η
θi
1− θi
Ri,et ω
i
t
ωit+1
]}
= (1− η)βωit
{
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
1
Ri,ht
[
Rm(B−A)
(m+ 1)B
+
A
B
Ri,eIFA
]}
= (1− η)βωit
(
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
Ri,ht
)
.
Using the definition of the relative loan rate, the investment sharing rule, and equations (12),
(13), (49), we get the solution to the social rate of return,
Rit+1 =
Ri,ht
ψit
= Ri,et
1− θi
ψit
1− θi =
ωit+1
ωit
RiIFA
1− θi
ψit
1− θi
ψiIFA
.
Substitute away Rit+1 in equation (39), we get the dynamic equation of wages (52),
ωit+1 =
(
ωit+1
Rit+1
)α
=
 ωit
RiIFA
1− θi
ψiIFA
1− θi
ψit
α = (ωitΛit
R
)α
, with Λit = Λ
i
IFA
1− θi
ψiIFA
1− θi
ψit
.
Second, prove the uniqueness and stability of the model economy. Given R∗,ht , we use
equations (50), (52), (39) to rewrite the dynamic equation of wages as,
ln
(
ωit
ωit+1
R∗,ht
ψiIFA − θi
Ri,hIFA
+ θi
)
= lnψit = lnR
∗,h
t − lnRit+1 = lnR∗,ht +
1
ρ
lnωit+1 (54)
⇒ lnωit+1 = −ρ lnR∗,ht + ρ ln
(
ωit
ωit+1
R∗,ht
ψiIFA − θi
Ri,hIFA
+ θi
)
. (55)
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Let W i ≡ ∂ lnω
i
t+1
∂ lnωit
. The first and the second derivatives of ωit+1 with respect to ω
i
t are
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
=
ωit+1
ωit
ρ
ρ+
ψit+1
ψit+1−θi
, ⇒ W i ≡ ∂ lnω
i
t+1
∂ lnωit
=
ρ
ρ+
ψit+1
ψit+1−θi
∈ (0, 1),
∂2ωit+1
∂(ωit)
2
= −(1−W i)(W i)2 ω
i
t+1
(ωit)
2
(1 + ρ)
ρ
Since W i ∈ (0, 1), we get ∂
2ωit+1
∂(ωit)
2 < 0. Thus, the phase diagram of wages is a concave function
under free mobility of financial capital if the borrowing constraints are binding.
According to equation (55), for ωit = 0, the phase diagram has a positive intercept on the
vertical axis at ωit+1 = (R
∗,h
t )
−ρ(θi)ρ. Define a threshold value ω¯it = R
i,e
IFA(R
∗,h
t )
− 1
1−α . For
ωit ∈ (0, ω¯it), the phase diagram of wages is monotonically increasing and concave. For ωit > ω¯it,
aggregate saving and investment are so high that the relative loan rate is equal to one, or
equivalently, Rit+1 = R
∗,h
t . Thus, the borrowing constraints are slack and the phase diagram is
flat with ωit+1 = ω¯
i
t+1 = (R
∗,h
t )
−ρ. Given R∗,ht < R < R
i,e
IFA, we get ω¯
i
t+1 < ω¯
i
t. In other words,
the kink point is below the 45 degree line.
Thus, the phase diagram of wages crosses the 45 degree line once and only once from the
left, and the intersection is in its concave part. Thus, the model economy has a unique and
stable steady state under free mobility of financial capital.
Finally, we prove the (partial) convergence of the relative loan rate. As the loan rate is
initially lower in country S, RS,hIFA < R
N,h
IFA, financial capital flows from country S to N, Φ
S
t >
0 > ΦNt , implying that ψ
S
t > ψ
S
IFA and ψ
N
t > ψ
N
IFA, according to equation (51). In the steady
state, given the world loan rate R∗,hFCF , the relative loan rate under financial integration is,
R∗,hFCF = R
i,h
IFA
ψiFCF − θi
ψiIFA − θi
= Ri,eIFA
ψiFCF − θi
1− θi = R
m+Bi
m+ 1
ψiFCF − θi
ηBi
,
⇒ ψiFCF =
R∗,hFCF
R
ηBi
m+ 1
m+Bi
+ θi
In order to prove ψSFCF < ψ
N
FCF , we just need to prove that
R∗,hFCF
R
η(m+ 1)
(
BS
m+BS
− B
N
m+BN
)
< θN − θS (56)
⇐ R
∗,h
FCF
R
η(m+ 1)
m(BS −BN )
(m+BS)(m+BN )
< θN − θS , (57)
⇐ R
∗,h
FCF
R
(m+ 1)m
(m+BS)(m+BN )
< 1, (58)
⇐ R∗,hFCFm < RN,hIFA(m+BS). (59)
Since 0 < R∗,hFCF < R
N,h
IFA and 0 ≤ m < m+BS , the inequality (59) must hold. Thus, we prove
the partial convergence of the relative loan rate, ψSIFA < ψ
S
FCF < ψ
N
FCF < ψ
N
IFA.
Let XFCF denote the steady-state value of variable X under free mobility of financial capital.
In the steady state,
ωit+1
ωit
= 1 and substitute it into the solution (49)-(52),
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Ri,eFCF = R
i,e
IFA, R
i,h
FCF = R
i,h
IFA +R
i,h
IFA
ψiFCF − ψiIFA
ψiIFA − θi
,
ΦiFCF = (1− η)ωiFCF
ψiFCF − ψiIFA
ψiFCF − θi
, ωiFCF =
(
1− θi
Ri,eFCF
+
θi
Ri,hFCF
)ρ
.
Proposition 4. In the steady state, the world loan rate is R∗,hFCF ∈ (RS,hIFA, RN,hIFA), implying
that ψSIFA < ψ
S
FCF < ψ
N
FCF < ψ
N
IFA; the equity rate in each country is the same as under IFA,
Ri,eFCF = R
i,e
IFA; financial capital flows from country S to country N, Φ
S
FCF > 0 > Φ
N
FCF .
If m > 0, the household saving rate responds positively to the changes in the relative loan
rate; if m = 0, the household saving rate is time invariant and the same as under IFA. The
entrepreneurial saving rate is time invariant and the same as under IFA.
si,ht
ωit
=
si,hIFA
ωiIFA
[
1 +
m
Ai
ψit − ψiIFA
ψit − θi
]
, and
si,et
ωit
=
si,eIFA
ωiIFA
B.2.2 Free Mobility of FDI
The analysis for free mobility of FDI yields a mirror image of that for free mobility of financial
capital and the main results are summarized as follows.15
Under free mobility of FDI, there exists a unique and stable steady state. Let XFDI denote
the steady-state value of variable X under free mobility of FDI. The loan rate is Ri,ht =
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
with the same steady-state value as under IFA, Ri,hFDI = R
i,h
IFA. FDI outflow from country i is
Ωit = ηβω
i
t
(
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA
R∗,et
)
= −βηωit
(
ψit−ψiIFA
ψi
IFA−θi
)
. Given the initial equity rate differential,
RS,eIFA > R
N,e
IFA, FDI flows from country N to country S, Ω
N
t > 0 > Ω
S
t , implying the partial
convergence of the relative loan rate, ψSIFA < ψ
S
t < ψ
N
t < ψ
N
IFA. The equity rate responds
negatively to the changes in the relative loan rate, Ri,et =
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA −
ωit+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA
[
ψit−ψiIFA
ψit−θi
]
.
The dynamic equation of wage is ωit+1 =
(
ωit
Λit
R
)
, with the aggregate efficiency indicator, Λit =
ΛiIFA
ψit
ψiIFA
, increasing in the relative loan rate. In the steady state, the world equity rate is
R∗,eFDI ∈ (RN,eIFA, RS,eIFA), FDI flows from country N to country S, ΩNFDI > 0 > ΩSFDI , where
ΩiFDI = ηβω
i
FDI
(R∗,eFDI−Ri,eIFA)
R∗,eFDI
, and the wage rate is ωSFDI > ω
S
IFA and ω
N
FDI < ω
N
IFA.
The household saving rate is time invariant and the same as under IFA. If m > 0, the
entrepreneurial saving rate responds negatively to the changes in the relative loan rate; ifm = 0,
the entrepreneurial saving rate is time invariant and the same as under IFA.
si,ht
ωit
=
si,hIFA
ωiIFA
, and
si,et
ωit
=
si,eIFA
ωiIFA
[
1− m
Bi
ψit − ψiIFA
ψiIFA − θi
]
.
B.3 Output Implications of Capital Mobility
Given m ∈ (0, 0.53) and θN = θ¯, we compute θ˜S for world output under full capital mobil-
ity as well as under the two alternative scenarios, i.e., free mobility of financial capital under
15See von Hagen and Zhang (2010) for detailed proofs and analysis.
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which individuals are allowed to lend abroad but entrepreneurs are not allowed to make direct
investments abroad, and free mobility of FDI under which entrepreneurs are allowed to make
direct investments abroad but individuals are not allowed to lend abroad. Figure 9 shows these
threshold values in the parameter space (θS ,m), where the solid curve denoted by θ˜SFCM , the
dash curve denoted by θ˜SFCF , and the dash-dot curve denoted by θ˜
S
FDI refer to the threshold
values under the scenarios of full capital mobility, free mobility of financial capital, and free
mobility of FDI, respectively. In each scenario, capital mobility raises the steady-state world
output if the parameters are in the region above the respective curve. As mentioned above, the
indirect effect, which contributes positively to world output, depends crucially on elastic saving.
Given θN and θS , a larger  leads to a larger interest elasticity of savings, represented by a
larger m. In this case, the output distortion of financial frictions under IFA is more severe. By
ameliorating the output distortion, capital mobility generates a stronger indirect effect through
elastic saving and world output is more likely to be higher than under IFA.
0.18
0.53
TSFCF
TSFCM
TSFDI
TN=TTS
m
O
A
B
C
D
E
~
_
~
~
Figure 9: Threshold Values under Three Scenarios of Capital Mobility
Let us first compare the scenarios of full capital mobility and free mobility of financial capital.
Under free mobility of financial capital, financial capital flows from country S to country N.
“Uphill” capital flows directly widen cross-country output gap, leading to world output losses;
by equalizing the loan rate across the border, financial capital flows indirectly induce households
in country S (N) to save more (less) and aggregate saving at the world level is higher, leading
to world output gains. The cross-country difference in θi has to be sufficiently large so that the
indirect effect can be strong enough to override the direct effect. In our example, the parameters
need to be in region A. Under full capital mobility, two-way capital flows imply that gross flows
are significantly larger than net flows. Thus, even if the cross-country difference in θi is small,
as in region B and C, the indirect effect may still dominate the direct effect. Thus, full capital
mobility dominates free mobility of financial capital in generating world output gains.
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Turning to free mobility of FDI alone, for parameters in region C, full capital mobility raises
world output, while free mobility of FDI reduces world output. However, for parameters in
region E, the opposite applies. Thus, full capital mobility does not necessarily dominate free
mobility of FDI in creating world output gains. Consider parameters in region C. As the cross-
country output gap under IFA is small in this case, free mobility of FDI reverses the output gap
through cross-country capital reallocation and the direct effect on world output is negative. The
indirect effect, which depends on gross capital flows, is small here. Under full capital mobility,
gross flows are significantly larger than net flows so that the indirect effect easily dominates the
direct effect and world output is higher. Consider parameters in region E where two countries
differ modestly in θi. Given the relatively large initial cross-country output gap under IFA, free
mobility of FDI directly narrows the cross-country output gap through cross-country capital
reallocation, implying a positive direct effect on world output. Thus, free mobility of FDI
strictly raises world output. In contrast, under full capital mobility, “uphill” net capital flows
imply that the direct effect is always negative and full capital mobility reduces world output.
Here, elastic saving is a critical channel through which full capital mobility may raise output
in the less financially developed country as well as globally. Shutting down either financial
capital or FDI flows may undermine such world output gains.
B.4 Welfare Implications of Full Capital Mobility in the Case
of Inelastic Saving
β and  are two key parameters affecting the aggregate implications of capital mobility. Subsec-
tion 3.2 shows the welfare implications of full capital mobility in the case of elastic saving,  > 0
and β < 1. In the following, we analyze the welfare implications in two cases of inelastic saving.
Scenario I:  = 0 and β ∈ (0, 1], i.e., individuals only have the labor income when young,
W
i,j
t = ω
i
t. If the individual is fully patient (β = 1), it saves its entire labor income and its
lifetime welfare only depends on its consumption when old, funded fully by its financial income,
ui,jt = c
i,j
o,t+1 = ω
i
tR
i,j
t . If it is impatient (β < 1), it consumes a fraction (1−β) of its labor income
when young and save the rest. Its lifetime welfare depends on its consumption in both periods of
life and the interest rate has smaller welfare impacts than in the case of β = 1, ui,jt = ω
i
t(R
i,j
t )
β.
Here, impatience weakens the welfare impacts of capital mobility via the interest rate channels.
 = 0 is a sufficient condition for interest-inelastic saving where capital mobility reduces
(raises) output in country S (N) and world output is lower than under IFA. For generation
t = 0, given the predetermined labor income, ωi0 = ω
i
IFA, capital mobility makes households
better (worse) off and entrepreneurs worse (better) off in country S (N) through the interest
rate channel. For generation t → ∞, the declines (rises) in labor income and the equity rate
make entrepreneurs in country S (N) worse (better) off than under IFA; as labor income and the
loan rate move in the opposite direction, the welfare implications to households are ambiguous.
Using equation (25) to substituting away ωiFCM , we rewrite the long-run household welfare as
ui,hFCM = ω
i
FCM (R
∗,h
FCM )
β =
[
(1− θi)R
∗,h
FCM
R∗,eFCM
+ θi
]ρ
(R∗,hFCM )
β−ρ.
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The loan rate converges across the border and so does the equity rate, i.e., RS,hIFA < R
∗,h
FCM <
RN,hIFA, and
RS,hIFA
RS,eIFA
<
R∗,hFCM
R∗,eFCM
<
RN,hIFA
RN,eIFA
. Thus, β ≥ ρ is a sufficient condition for households in
country S (N) to be better (worse) off in the long run than under IFA. Intuitively, being more
patient (a larger β) amplifies the impacts of interest rates on welfare so that the interest rate
effect is more likely to dominate the labor income effect.
Figure 10 shows the percentage change in welfare under full capital mobility versus under
IFA in the case of  = 0 and β = 1. The dashed lines show the welfare changes for generation
t = 0,
(
ui,j0
ui,jIFA
− 1
)
100, and the solid lines for generation t → ∞,
(
ui,jFCM
ui,jIFA
− 1
)
100. The upper
(lower) panels show the variables in country S (N) with θS ∈ (0, θ¯) on the horizontal axes. The
parameter values are the same as in the numerical example in subsection 3.1, except β = 1 and
 = 0. Changes in the welfare of generation t = 0 (t → ∞) reflect the short-run (long-run)
welfare implications. Figure 11 shows the welfare changes in the case of  = 0 and β = 0.4.
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Figure 10: Percentage Changes in the Short- and Long-Run Welfare:  = 0 and β = 1
We choose the conventional value for the capital share in the aggregate production function,
α = 0.36. If β = 1, β > ρ so that households in country S (N) are strictly better (worse) off
in the long run, as shown in figure 10; if β = 0.4, β < ρ so that households in country S (N)
may be worse (better) off in the long run, as shown in figure 11. The welfare responses of other
individuals are qualitatively the same in the two cases.
The social welfare of generation t is defined as the weighted sum of the welfare of individuals
born in period t, U it ≡ (1−η)ui,ht +ηui,et = ωitM(Ri,ht , Ri,et , β), whereM(x1, x2, p) is the auxiliary
function defined in subsection B.1. Full capital mobility affects social welfare of generation t
through their labor income, ωit, and a composite of interest rates in the form of a weighted
average with power β, M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β). Upon capital mobility, the responses in labor income
are unambiguous, while the responses in the composite of interest rates depend on β, which is
analyzed as follows.
Figure 12 shows the composite of interest rates in the space of (Ri,h, Ri,e). Point S (N)
denotes the interest rate combination in country S (N) in the steady state under IFA, point A
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Figure 11: Percentage Changes in the Short- and Long-Run Welfare:  = 0 and β = 0.4
denotes that in period t = 0, and point L denotes that in period t→∞, i.e., in the steady state
under full capital mobility.16 According to equations (10) and (21), the reward splitting rules
in the steady state under IFA and under full capital mobility, (1 − η)Ri,hIFA + ηRi,eIFA = R =
(1 − η)R∗,hFCM + ηR∗,eFCM , implying that point S, N, and L are on the same isoquant (the thin
solid straight line). As capital mobility reduces world output, the world-average wage in period
t = 1 falls. The reward-splitting rule (21) in period t = 0, (1 − η)R∗,h0 + ηR∗,e0 = ω
w
1
ωw0
R < R,
implies that point A is on an isoquant (the thick solid straight line) below the previous one.
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Figure 12: Graphic Illustration of M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) under Full Capital Mobility versus IFA
M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) can also be shown as the isoquant in the space of (R
i,h, Ri,e). In the case
of β = 1, the isoquant of M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , 1) is a downward-sloping straight line and coincides with
the one representing the reward splitting rule. See the left panel of figure 12. In period t = 0,
M(Ri,h0 , R
i,e
0 , 1) =
ωw1
ωw0
R < R, while in the steady state under IFA and under full capital mobility,
M(Ri,hIFA, R
i,e
IFA, 1) = M(R
i,h
FCM , R
i,e
FCM , 1) = R. Thus, the composite of interest rates declines
16Under full capital mobility, the loan rate converges across the border and so does the equity rate.
Thus, the interest rates in period t = 0 and in period t→∞ must be in the region to the lower-right of
point S and to the upper-left of point N.
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in period t = 0 and converges in the long run back to its initial level. It is driven by the
world-average output growth effect.
In the case of β < 1, the isoquant of M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) is convex and downward-sloping.
The dashed curves and the solid curve in the middle panel of figure 12 are the isoquants of
M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) in the steady state under IFA and under full capital mobility. Due to the
Jensen’s inequality theorem, M(RS,hIFA, R
S,e
IFA, β) < M(R
i,h
FCM , R
i,e
FCM , β) < M(R
N,h
IFA, R
N,e
IFA, β).
The dashed curves and the solid curve in the right panel of figure 12 show the isoquants
of M(Ri,ht , R
i,e
t , β) before and in period t = 0, respectively. The world-average growth ef-
fect reduces M(Ri,h0 , R
i,e
0 , β), while the Jensen’s inequality effect reduces M(R
S,h
IFA, R
S,e
IFA, β).
If β is sufficiently small, the Jensen’s inequality effect dominates so that M(Ri,h0 , R
i,e
0 , β) >
M(RS,hIFA, R
S,e
IFA, β); if β is sufficiently close to one, the world-average growth effect dominates so
that M(Ri,h0 , R
i,e
0 , β) < M(R
S,h
IFA, R
S,e
IFA, β). Nevertheless, M(R
i,h
0 , R
i,e
0 , β) < M(R
N,h
IFA, R
N,e
IFA, β)
always holds.
Let us analyze the responses of social welfare. For generation t = 0, given the labor income,
ωi0 = ω
i
IFA, social welfare is driven by the composite of interest ratesM(R
i,h
0 , R
i,e
0 , β). Thus, the
social welfare in country N declines while the responses of social welfare in country S depends on
β. For generation t → ∞, since the changes in the labor income and the composite of interest
rates are opposite, the social welfare implications are ambiguous, depending on β.
Let us compare the social welfare responses in the cases of β = 0.4 versus β = 1 (the third
columns of figures 11 and 10). For a decline in β from 1 to 0.4, the short-run social welfare
responses in country S changes from negative to positive and so does the long-run social welfare
responses for θS close to zero. Thus, (im)patience is an important factor affecting the welfare
implications of capital mobility.
Scenario II:  > 0 and β = 1, i.e., individuals have the labor income in both periods but
they consume only when old. Due to inelastic saving, the output implications are identical as in
scenario I. Take the case of  = 0 and β = 1 in scenario I as the benchmark case. An individual’s
lifetime welfare depends on its financial income and labor income when old,
ui,jt = c
i,j
o,t+1 = ω
i
tR
i,j
t + ω
i
t+1 = ω
i
t
(
Ri,jt + 
ωit+1
ωit
)
,
where 
ωit+1
ωit
is the human wealth. A larger  raises the relative importance of human wealth in
the lifetime welfare.
For generation t = 0, given the predetermined labor income ωi0 = ω
i
IFA, the welfare implica-
tions to entrepreneurs are qualitatively the same as in the benchmark case, because the equity
rate and the wage move in the same direction; the welfare implications to households are weak-
ened or may even be reversed, as the loan rate and the wage move in the opposite direction. For
generation t → ∞, an individual’s welfare, ui,jFCM = ωiFCM (Ri,jFCM + ), depends on the wage,
the relevant interest rate, and . Compared with the benchmark case,  > 0 weakens but does
not change qualitatively the welfare implications to entrepreneurs. 17
17If both ωSFCM and R
S,e
FCM fall by 1%, u
S,e
FCM falls by 2% in the benchmark case and less than 2% in
the current case.
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Lemma 5. 1+ ≤ θ
i
1−η (1 − ρ) is a sufficient condition under which households of generation
t→∞ in country S (N) are better (worse) off than under IFA.
Proof. Use equation (25) to substitute away the wage in the steady state,
ui,hFCM = ω
i
FCM (R
i,h
FCM + ) =
[
(1− θi)R
∗,h
FCM
R∗,eFCM
+ θi
]ρ
[(R∗,hFCM )
1−ρ + (R∗,hFCM )
−ρ].
Consider country S first. Compared with the scenario under IFA,
R∗,hFCM
R∗,eFCM
>
R∗,hIFA
R∗,eIFA
. Thus, a
sufficient condition for uS,hFCM > u
S,h
IFA is [(R
∗,h
FCM )
1−ρ+ (R∗,hFCM )
−ρ] > [(RS,hIFA)
1−ρ+ (RS,hIFA)
−ρ],
or equivalently to prove the function Y = x1−ρ + x−ρ is an increasing function of x for x ∈
(RS,hIFA, R
S,h
FCM ). A sufficient condition for the latter is (1− ρ)x−ρ − ρx−ρ−1 > 0 or x(1−ρ)ρ > .
If
RS,hIFA(1−ρ)
ρ >  holds, Y is an increasing function of x for x ∈ (RS,hIFA, RS,hFCM ). Use equation
(13) to plug in the analytical solution of RS,hIFA =
θi
1−η (1 + )ρ, we get

1+ ≤ θ
i
1−η (1− ρ).
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Figure 13: Short-Run and Long-Run Welfare Analysis with β = 1 and  = 1
A larger  weakens the impact of the loan rate on the household’s welfare. Similarly, a
smaller θi implies a smaller Ri,hIFA and thus, given the positive constant , the impact of the
loan rate is weakened. In both cases, the labor income effect is more likely to dominate and the
condition in lemma 5 is less likely to hold.
Given the reward splitting rule (21), the social welfare of generation t is
U it = (1− η)ci,ho,t+1 + ηci,eo,t+1 = ωit[(1− η)Ri,ht + ηRi,et ] + ωit+1 = ωit
(
ωwt+1
ωwt
R+ 
ωit+1
ωit
)
.
Compared with the benchmark case,  > 0 does not change the social welfare implications,
except for generation t = 0 in country N. The wage rise in period t = 1 weakens or even reverse
the welfare implications to generation t = 0 in country N through the term 
ωNt+1
ωNt
.
Figure 13 shows the welfare implications of moving from IFA to full capital mobility. Similar
as in the benchmark case, full capital mobility has the opposite welfare implications in the intra-
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and intergenerational dimensions. As discussed above, households in country S are worse off in
the long run for θS close to zero and the social welfare of generation t = 0 in country N rises,
different from the results in the benchmark case. This way, the positive human wealth ( > 0)
becomes an additional channel through which capital mobility affects welfare.
In the benchmark case and in scenario II, output is a sufficient statistics for social welfare.
Due to world output losses, social welfare at the world level is lower than under IFA.
B.5 Robustness Tests for Emerging Asian Economies
We check the robustness of our results reported in subsection 3.4 by considering three alternative
samples of emerging Asian economies. Sample (A) includes ASEAN-5, China, India, Korea, and
Taiwan, which is called EAE-9 in short; sample (B) includes ASEAN-5, China and India; and
sample (C) includes ASEAN-5, Korea, and Taiwan.
Take the right panels of figure 5 as the benchmark. Figure 14 shows that “two-way” gross
capital flows and net capital outflows exist in the three alternative samples of emerging Asia;
the upper-right panel of figure 14 shows that the size of FDI inflows in sample (C) is smaller
than in ASEAN-5, which is driven by FDI outflows from Korea and Taiwan; the lower-middle
panel of figure 14 shows that the size of PFCF outflows in sample (B) is smaller, which is driven
by PFCF inflows to India. In particular, financial capital flows in the three alternative samples
are essentially driven by the enormous foreign reserve accumulation in China, India, Korea, and
Taiwan in 2000s, which eventually drives net capital flows, given the relatively stable FDI flows.
Figure 15 shows the patterns of domestic credit to private sector in percentage of GDP and per
capita GDP growth rate in the three alternative samples.
Table 2 report the regression results in four alternative settings for three alternative samples.
Take table 1 as the benchmark. Including the four economies in the three alternative ways do
not change the regression results qualitatively in the sense that γ1 and γ2 are negative and
statistically significant at the 10% level, except in setting (4) and sample (C).
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Figure 14: Patterns of Capital Flows in Emerging Asian Economies
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